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BOYLES, JR., N. BENNETT. The Legal Aspects of 
the Public School Academic Curriculum. (1981). 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 112. 
The public school academic curriculum has been the 
subject of litigation on numerous occasions at higher 
levels of court jurisdiction. Since the mid-1800's, 
plaintiff after plaintiff has questioned the right of 
state legislatures to prescribe which courses may be a 
part of the curriculum, the right of state legislatures 
to delegate decision-making power to local boards of 
education, and the right of local boards of education to 
make and enforce curriculum decisions for their respective 
schools. 
Litigation in the curriculum area was characterized 
by inconsistent rulings during the late 1800's and early 
1900*s. During that period of time, however, trends 
were already emerging in court opinions. The first concerned 
the right of a parent to have a voice in determining which 
course of study a student would take. Regarding this issue, 
the opinions almost invariably reinforced the necessity, 
both moral and legal, of allowing a parent some latitude in 
making curriculum selection or in requesting exclusions from 
particular courses of study. 
Second, court opinions emphasized time and again 
that the power to prescribe what courses are to be taught 
in school is a right of the state legislature. 
Third, court opinions during the era from 1850 to 
about 1925 emphasized the delegatory powers of the state 
legislature and the powers of the local boards. The courts 
clearly established that legislatures could delegate to 
local boards of education the discretionary power to select 
the course of studies, in addition to those specified by 
statute, to be taught by the public schools. 
The fourth area of persistency in rulings also 
involved parental input, and went a step further than 
rulings related to the first area mentioned in this 
summary section. Court opinions legislate that parental 
input in curriculum matters must be respected. Many opinions 
further stated that a student whose parent had given written 
request for exclusion from a particular course of studies 
could not be corporally punished or expelled from school 
for failure to comply with the school official's directives. 
Cases which arose after World War I resulted in 
opinions which added support to prior decisions and 
created new rulings in other areas. 
Many cases were litigated in the area of foreign 
language, with the courts consistently supporting the 
right of the state legislature and the school board to 
include foreign language courses in the curriculum. The 
courts also established the right of a parent to determine 
whether his child would be enrolled in the foreign language 
course. 
A volume of cases arose in the area of health and 
physical education. Once again, the courts consistently 
supported the right of school officials to offer physical 
education either as an elective or as a required course 
in the curriculum, but carefully scrutinized some of the 
activities associated with the required courses. 
Questions in the areas of music and art, vocational 
education, mathematics and science, and social studies, 
were not frequently subjects for litigation. In the few 
cases which did come to the attention of the higher 
court justices, rulings were consistent with those in areas 
of language arts, foreign language, and health and physical 
education. 
This study reviews literature related to the stance 
of the courts with regard to the public school academic 
curriculum. The study also traces the actions of the 
courts in each of the curriculum areas. Next, the study 
presents an in-depth analysis of landmark cases in each 
of the subject matter areas defined as a part of the study. 
In conclusion, the study summarizes the legal aspects of 
the public school academic curriculum. 
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CHAPTER X 
INTRODUCTION 
The court system of the United States has historically 
proved a very real asset to society. Although certainly 
not infallible, the courts have acted firmly and fairly to 
provide equity, justice and stability for a struggling 
country, in dire need of jurisprudence. 
The influence which these courts have exerted has been 
pervasive throughout all spheres of man's existence; there 
is virtually no facet which has not been litigated at some 
time or another. The cases in which the courts have become 
involved run the gamut from minor civil matters, such as 
divorce or bankruptcy, to major criminal matters in which 
devastating crimes and capital punishment were involved. 
Generally, because of glamor or perhaps morbidity on 
the part of the public, the criminal actions have tended to 
overshadow many wise and eloquent decisions which have 
evolved in other areas. 
One of these "unglamorous" but vitally important areas 
of public life is the world of education, a world which is 
characterized by ambiguity and chaos. Litigation, perhaps 
caused by this very ambiguity, has occurred much more 
frequently in this area than the general public has any idea 
of. Despite this dearth of public knowledge concerning 
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education litigation, numerous successful attempts have been 
made to consolidate the court proceedings which have taken 
place in a variety of educational areas. 
There have been hundreds of civil and criminal cases 
concerning integration, bussing, corporal punishment, 
separation of church and state, students' rights and teachers' 
rights. These dramatic cases have been publicized by the 
news media to some degree and remain firmly planted in the 
minds of those who are interested in education. 
There is, however, another less dramatic area of liti­
gation in education of equal if not greater importance 
than those more widely publicized cases mentioned above. 
Litigation in this vital area, is important because the 
decisions involved have been the determining factors of the 
subjects which students study in the public school academic 
curriculum. 
PURPOSES 
The purposes of this study concerning the courts and 
the academic curriculum are as follows: 
1. To review literature related to the stance of 
the courts regarding the public school academic curriculum; 
2. To trace historically decisions of the courts 
through actions which have evolved in each of the academic 
curriculum areas; 
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3. To provide detailed analysis of illustrative, 
landmark cases in each of the public school academic 
curriculum areas; 
4. To establish the position of the courts with regard 
to the public school academic curriculum. 
METHODOLOGY 
The predominant research technique of this study 
involved examination and analysis of available references 
concerning the courts and the academic curriculum. Searches 
were made of a number of sources, including Dissertation 
Abstracts, the Reader1s Guide to Periodical Literature, 
Education Index and The Index to Legal Periodicals• 
General research summaries were also examined and 
analyzed from Encyclopedia of Education Research, a variety 
of books on school law, and other sources which were 
discovered in a search through the Educational Resources 
Information Center (ERIC). 
State and Federal court cases related to the topic 
were located through utilization of the Corpus Juris 
Secundum, School Law Bulletin, the National Reporter 
System, the American Digest System and through the help 
of the Institute of Government at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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After preliminary research was conducted according to 
the plan outlined above, a five-step approach was utilized, 
which facilitated the accomplishment of the explicit purposes 
i 
of this study. 
First, it was essential to define the "courts" to 
develop the concept of "public school academic curriculum" 
in order to avoid definitional discrepancy. This process 
of definition and concept development was accomplished by 
the extraction and presentation of excerpts from writings 
on curriculum by Bolmeier, Krug, Anderson, Eisner and 
Vallance, Taba, Short, and Marconnit and Alpren. 
Second, having established those subjects which the 
public school academic curriculum encompasses, illustra­
tive court cases were presented chronologically, demonstrating 
the position that the courts have taken in academic curriculum 
matters. 
Third, the study provided the reader a complete anthol­
ogy of court cases in each of the academic curriculum 
areas, including language arts, foreign language, health 
and physical education, music and art, vocational education, 
mathematics and science, and social studies. This compre­
hensive approach was utilized in order to demonstrate the 
variety of academic curriculum areas in which rulings have 
been made, to trace general trends and specific thrusts of 
the courts through the years, and to illustrate the eloquent 
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nature of the justices' rulings. This third step furnishes 
general summary information for each instance of litigation 
from the various academic curriculum areas, beginning with 
early cases, such as Guernsey v. Pitkin, and ending with 
very recent litigation, such as Palmer v. Board of Education 
of City of Chicago. 
Fourth, having provided a complete index of cases, 
the study proceeds to critically analyze a landmark case 
in each of the academic curriculum areas. By this means, 
the complex issues involved were elucidated, the exquisite 
logic and language of the justices was illustrated, and an 
understanding was achieved as to the role which these 
landmark cases have played in academic curriculum development 
and maintenance. 
Fifth, this study culminated with summary statements 
and a list of conclusions concerning the legal aspects of 
the public school academic curriculum. 
DEFINITIONS 
Two terms which are vital to an understanding of the 
topic are the "courts" and the "public school academic 
curriculum." Their definition follows. 
The Courts 
Through the years, a myriad of court cases in the 
academic curriculum area have evolved at all levels of the 
legal system. Undeniably, each of these cases, whether at 
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high, intermediate or lower levels is important. For the 
purpose of this study, however, and because of the virtual 
impossiblity of presenting every case which has ever been 
litigated, the "courts," definitionally, refers almost 
exclusively to the various state supreme courts and to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
As a note of clarification, the phrase, "almost 
exclusively," is used since there are some lower court 
decisions which must be included because of their landmark 
nature or their importance to the overall study. 
The Public School Academic Curriculum 
In order to arrive at a definition of "public school 
academic curriculum," the writings of a number of authors 
were utilized. The thoughts of these writers are presented 
in the next several sections of this first chapter. Then, 
a summary statement synthesizing their ideas, and a consensus 
statement of those courses which are encompassed by the 
academic curriculum, concludes the chapter. 
Edward C;. Bolmeier. Bolmeier stated, in his chapter 
on "Discretionary Authority of School Boards Over the 
Curriculum," the following: 
Any consideration of the legal aspects of the 
curriculum is complicated by the diversity of opinion 
as to what a curriculum really is. On the one extreme, 
there are those who conceive the curriculum to be 
only an array of subjects or courses for which credit, 
in terms of "Carnegie units," is allowed. On the 
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other extreme, some view the curriculum as all exper­
iences offered to children under the aegis of the 
school.1 
Given the limitations inherent in the term "academic" 
and the thoughts which subsequent writings present, it will 
become apparent that the first part of Bolmeier's definition 
is more relevant than the second, to this disseration 
topic. 
Edward A. Krug. Krug offered a definition of curriculum 
which augmented Bolmeier's thoughts and further defined the 
deliberate nature of the educational experiences provided. 
He stated: 
Curriculum consists of the means of instruction 
used by the school to provide opportunities for student 
learning experiences leading to desired outcomes.2 
Vernon E. Anderson. Anderson continued Krug's vein 
of deliberateness in educational planning and introduces 
the concept of required courses. He stated: 
The term with the most precise meaning for the 
list of courses offered and for the grouping of 
required and elected courses to attain some educa­
tional objectives is the program of studies. 
1 
Edward C. Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure 
(Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1974), p. 281. 
2 Edward A. Krug, Curriculum Planning rev. ed.; New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 3. 
o 
Vernon E. Anderson, Principles and Procedures of 
Curriculum Improvement (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), 
p. 5. 
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As this definitional exercise continues, it will 
become more and more clear that Anderson's "program of 
studies" is essentially synonymous with other authors' 
definitions of academic curriculum. 
Elliot Eisner and Elizabeth Vallance. Eisner and 
Vallance, in their discussion of "academic rationalism," 
proposed the following, introducing for the first time in 
this study, the concept of the "classic disciplines." 
They stated: 
The curriculum, it is argued, should emphasize 
the classic disciplines through which man inquires 
since these disciplines, almost by definition, provide 
concepts and criteria through which thought acquires 
precision, generality and power; such disciplines 
exemplify intellectual activity at its best.^ 
Hilda Taba. Taba, in discussing the "Subject Orga­
nization," quoted Sidney Hook, as he described important 
powers and areas of knowledge. Hook stated: 
Education should aim to develop students' 
capabilities to write and speak clearly and 
effectively, to deal competently with number 
and figure, to think critically and constructively, 
to judge discriminately and observe carefully, to 
appreciate and respect personal and cultural 
differences, to enjoy with sensibility the worlds 
of art and music, and to enrich the imagination 
^Elliot W. Eisner and Elizabeth Vallance, Conflicting 
Conceptions of Curriculum (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974), 
p. 12. 
and deepen insight into the hearts of men by the 
study of literature, drama and poetry.... the 
physical and biological world....history, the 
social studies and the study of the great maps 
of life.5 
Edmund C. Short and George D. Marconnit. Short and 
Marconnit follow up Anderson's "program of studies" defi­
nition given earlier. They specify the actual subjects 
in their own "program of studies," defining this program 
as one of the elements of the total "Educational Program." 
The subjects which they list are as follows: 
The Language Arts, Arithmetic, Science, Health 
and Physical Education, Social Studies, Music, 
Vocational Education and Foreign Languages. 
Excerpts are next extracted from writings by the last 
author in this section. As these concluding definitional 
thoughts are presented, it is important to note the consis­
tency of this author with preceding writers, especially in 
terms of those subjects designated as essential elements of 
the academic curriculum. 
Morton Alpren. Alpren, in his anthology of writings 
entitled, The Subject Curriculum; Grades K-12, specifically 
5Hilda Taba, Curriculum Development: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 384-385. 
C. 
Edmund C. Short and George D. Marconnit, Contemporary 
Thought on Public School Curriculum (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. 
Brown, 1968), p. 4. 
7Ibid. 
delineated, those subjects which are integral parts of the 
"scope and sequence of the curriculum."® 
He listed the subjects as: 
English, Social Studies, Foreign Language, 
Science, Mathematics, Health and Physical 
Education, Music, Art and Vocational Education.^ 
Alpren defined the subject aspect of the curriculum 
as "content, subject matter or what is to be taught and 
learned. 
SUMMARY 
The definition of the courts which will be utilized 
for the purposes of this study refers to the various state 
supreme courts and to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, except in instances of landmark lower court 
decisions. 
A definition of the academic curriculum, which will 
be utilized for the purposes of this study, has evolved in 
the form of a synthesis of thought from the preceding 
authors. A synthesized definition: (1) establishes the 
academic curriculum as that program of specified courses 
which has been deliberately designed to provide educational 
®Morton Alpren, The Subject Curriculum: Grades K-12 
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1967), p. xii. 
9ibid., pp. xii, xiii. 1®Ibid., p. 3. 
experiences leading to desired outcomes, and (2) defines 
those specified courses as language arts, foreign language, 
health and physical education, music and art, vocational 
education, mathematics and science, and social studies. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Chapter II is a review of selected cases and is 
designed to establish the position of the courts with regard 
to the academic curriculum. 
During the middle part of the 1800's, questions arose 
about the subjects which were designated as essential parts 
of the programs of studies in the schools of the United 
States. Initial litigation in this area spoke to the ques­
tions posed with as much expertise and judicial wisdom as 
was available at that time. The problems were temporarily 
or permanently solved and a number of precedents were set. 
More important is the fact that these initial cases 
forced the courts into establishing their position in 
the academic curriculum area. In this chapter, a number 
of court cases are reviewed in order to illustrate the 
initial stand which the courts adopted and to show the 
philosophical changes in thought and trend over the 
years. 
The academic curriculum has historically existed in a 
state of flux. Although consistency has been inherent in 
the majority of the decisions which will be reviewed, it is 
important to note signs of metamorphosis, meeting the 
changing needs of education and society. 
THE CASES 
Historically, the courts have placed the right to 
decide which subjects should be included in the academic 
curriculum as the responsibility of the various state 
legislatures. Perhaps the first precedent-setting case 
concerning this "right to decide" came before the Illinois 
Supreme Court in 188111 when that court established that 
the legislature not only had the power to decide such 
academic curriculum matters, but also was empowered to 
delegate, by statute, the right to decide to the local 
school authorities. This case, then, set the foundation 
for the tremendous amount of discretionary authority which 
the courts have given to local boards over the academic 
curriculum. 
A second decision concerning this responsibility for 
determination of academic curricular matter came out of the 
12 Supreme Court of Missouri in 1883. A quotation from that 
case, epitomizing the prevalent thought at that time, reads 
as follows: 
The power of the prescribing which shall or 
which shall not be taught in said schools rests 
with the Legislature of the State and not with 
the Courts. The Legislature may, from time to 
*1 *1 
x Powell v. Board of Education of Illinois, 97 
111., 375, Am. Rep. 123 (1881). 
•®"^Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 77 Mo. 484, 
(1883). 
time, exercise this power and make such modifications 
and changes as in its wisdom and discretion may 
seem fit and proper for the purposes of the grant, 
subject only to the Constitution of the State.... 
In 1886, the Supreme Court of Indiana1^ further rein­
forced this embryonic judical view of legislative power in 
academic curriculum determination, paving the way for 
greater clarification, as that court defined legislative 
powers in 189015 as follows: 
It is impossible to conceive of the existence 
of a uniform system of common schools without 
power lodged somewhere to make it uniform and, even 
in the absence of express constitutional provisions, 
that power must necessarily reside in the legislature. 
If it does not reside there, then that body must 
have....the authority to prescribe the course of 
study and the system of instruction that shall be 
pursued.... as well as the books which shall be used. 
Several years later, an Indiana court ruled in the 
Myers Publishing Co. Case of 1901, that: 
....the Legislature has given the trustees 
of the public school corporations the discretionary 
power to direct....what branches of learning, in 
addition to those specified in the statutes, shall 
be taught in the public schools of their respective 
corporations. 
13Ibid. 
14 State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 
8 NE 708 (1886). 
•^State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 
23 NE 946 (1890). 
16Ibid. 
17 Myers Publishing Co. v. White River School 
Township, 28 Ind. App., 91 62NE 66 (1910). 
18Ibid. 
This decision made it clear that local boards of 
education as well as the state legislators were vested by 
the courts with decision-making power in the area of 
academic curriculum. 
A number of court decisions have been rendered con­
cerning the right of school boards to prescribe required 
academic curricular activities or prohibit students from 
partaking in some academic curricular activity which is or 
might be made available. 
A case of this nature surfaced in the Nebraska Supreme 
Court in 1914-^, when a student's father protested her 
required attendance in a domestic science class. The class 
presented a travel problem and time spent in route threatened 
to waste a substantial portion of the girl's afternoon. 
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, demonstrating 
logic and compassion for individual rights. 
The public school is one of the main bulwarks 
of our nation, and we would not knowingly do anything 
to undermine it; but we should be careful to avoid 
permitting our love for this noble institution to 
cause us to regard it 'all in all' and destroy both 
the god-given and constitutional right of a parent 
to have some voice in the bringing up and education 
of his children. 
Instate ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 
144 NW 1039 (1914). 
20Ibid. 
A similar case in a California court cropped up in 
192121, but, in this instance, the court ruled in favor of 
parents who wanted their children excused from dancing 
exercises as a part of the physical education program. The 
court ruling established the inclusion of dancing exercises 
as legitimate, but critized school authorities for expelling 
the children from school. The students were reinstated 
in the Physical Education class, and assigned to other 
activities. 
A Supreme Court of Massachusetts decision further 
defined the powers of academic curriculum determination 
by adjudicating the school committee responsible for 
"making all reasonable rules and regulations for the 
government, discipline and management of the schools and.... 
22 determination of the subjects to be taught" (1922). 
In 1923, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Meyer vs. 
Nebraska that German could be included in the school 
academic curriculum (this case will be discussed in subse­
quent chapters). Of importance to this general section, 
the court ruled that 
2lHardwick v. Board of Trustees of Fruitridge School 
District, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac. 49 (1921). 
^Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 
Mass. 325, 135 NE 459 (1922). 
23Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923). 
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the power of the state to compel attendance 
at some school and to make reasonable regulations 
at all schools.... is not questioned. Nor has 
challenge been made of the state's power to 
prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it 
supports.24 
Further court decisions in this general area serve to 
support the foregoing case histories. Both in the Indiana 
Supreme Court (1924)25 and the Iowa Supreme Court (1926)26, 
judgments clearly defined the role of both the legislature 
(Indiana) and the school board of directors (Iowa) as to 
the determination of academic subject matter to be imparted 
to students, even though "outside of the definitive and 
specific things which are required to be taught in the public 
schools."2^ 
The courts added further support to the legislature's 
. ? ft powers in a 1930 North Carolina Supreme Court decision. 
It read, in part: 
The General Assembly has the power, which we 
think cannot be questioned to prescribe by statute 
the subjects to be taught and the methods of instruc­
tion to be followed in the public schools of the 
state, whether such public schools be included within 
the uniform system required to be maintained by the 
constitution, or whether they be public schools 
24Ibid. 
25Follett v. Sheldon, 144 NE, 867 Ind. (1924). 
2 6 Security National Bank of Mason City v. Bagley, 
202 Iowa 701, 210 NW 947 (1926). 
2^Evelyn R. Fulbright and Edward C. Bolmeier, Courts 
and the Curriculum (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1964), p. 42. 
28posey v. Board of Education of Buncombe County, 199 
NC 306, 154SE393 (1930). 
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established for certain districts formed 
under the general school law by the state, or 
under specific statutes."29 
Thus, history has shown from early court proceedings 
through this 1930 case that the courts decidedly view 
academic curriculum decision-making as the responsibility 
of the state legislatures and the local school boards. 
An interesting addition to the foregoing decisions 
occurred with the 1937 opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Kansas30, which recognized that "school boards and boards 
of education may provide for instruction in subjects 
other than those required by statute." The court added, 
however, that they may in so doing exercise a discretion 
with which courts may not interfere, in the absence of 
O T  
clear case of fraud or abuse." This decision not only 
further defined the school board's role as mentioned, but 
clearly defined, once again, the position of the courts in 
academic curriculum affairs. 
Two 1939 Pennsylvania cases led to rulings on curriculum. 
In the first, the decision stated that "the school's directors 
and superintendent must keep up with changing curriculum 
trends even though this resulted in the loss of a subject, 
29Ibid. 
30State Tax Commission v. Board of Education of 
Holton, 46 Kan. 722, 73P (2d) 49 (1937). 
31Ibid. 
ergo a teacher."-*2 in the second33, the ruling established 
that "a department, not prescribed by statute, could be 
discontinued"34 since the responsibility of the adminis­
trators is "to control, change and correct the curriculum."3^ 
A 1941 decision in the Iowa Supreme Court reinforced 
the courts1 philosophy toward state responsibility, but 
added a warning note that this responsibility must carry 
with it a flexibility designed to "meet the needs of the 
37 times," both in the areas of policy making and teaching 
force. 
In 1950, another curriculum case of interest arose in 
•  O  Q  
a Missouri courtJO having to do, once again, with the 
deletion of a course from the academic curriculum. In this 
case, the court asserted that "a board of education has 
complete discretion to determine what courses shall be 
given, continued or discontinued and its discretion shall 
32Jones v. Holes, 334 Pa. 538, 6A (2d) 102 (1939). 
33 
Ehret v. School District of Borough of Kulpmont, 
333Pa518, 5A(2d) 188 (1939). 
34 Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 43. 
35Ibid., p. 43. 
3 6 
Talbott v. Independent School District of Des 
Moines, 230 Iowa 249, 299NW556 (1941). 
37Ibid. 
3 8 
State ex rel. Brewton v. Board of Education of 
St. Louis, 361 Mo. 86, 233SW(2d) 697 (1959). 
not be controlled or interfered with by the courts."39 
Through this ruling, the court again established its position, 
and further entrenched the school board as chief academic 
curriculum decision maker. 
A decision establishing even more clearly the court's 
position on the legislature's role emerged in a 1955 opinion 
delivered by the Michigan Supreme Court.The ruling spoke 
to matters which had been addressed previously and added 
"division of territories of the state into school districts, 
conduct of schools, qualifications of teachers, and subjects 
to be taught therein, are all within the control of the 
legislature. 
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana followed much the 
same drift as the 1950 Missouri case, when an opinion was 
delivered in 1962^, stating that "the court does not have 
the function of sitting in judgment on the propriety of a 
school curriculum which school officials have determined to 
be necessary and proper."43 Through a decision such as this, 
the power of the state was further fortified, and the role 
of the courts was much more clearly defined. 
39 
Ibid. 
^Sturgis v. County of Allegan, 343 Mich. 207, 
72NW(2d) 56 (1955). 
41_, . , 
Ibid. 
42 
State v. Aroyelles Parish School Board, 147 
S(2d) 729 La. (1962). 
43Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 44. 
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A classic example of the eloquent language in rulings 
made by justices in the curriculum area resulted from a 
Michigan case in 1969.44 The ruling established: 
It was the responsibility of the State Board of 
Education to supervise a system of free public 
schools and, as part thereof, to promulgate 
regulations specifying hours to constitute school 
days for all classifications or groupings of 
students, to determine curricula and, generally, 
to exercise leadership and supervision over 
public school system. 
And further: 
Absent rule or regulation by State Board of 
Education or local school boards did not abuse 
discretion in providing for half-day sessions because 
of lack of funds or for teaching of certain subjects 
on compressed schedule, and no clear legal duty 
was shown on part of local boards which would give 
rise to right to mandamus or mandatory injunction. 5 
Another important case which illustrates the position 
of the courts with regard to the academic curriculum has to 
do with methodology rather than with academic curriculum, 
4 6 
per se. In 1970 , the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
"the discretionary power of school boards was sufficiently 
broad to encompass the establishment of an elementary 
44Welling v. Board of Education for Livonia School 
District, 171 NW(2d) 545, 382 Michigan 620 (1969). 
45Ibid. 
46 Schwan v. Board of Education of Lansing School 
District, 17 Mich. App. 391, 183NW(2d) 594 (1970). 
nongraded school program.The decision went on to say 
that "general supervision over public education was vested 
in the State Board of Education and that there had been no 
action by that State Board prohibiting the establishment 
of non-graded schools."48 
The final case^, which ended up in an Illinois court 
in 1979, further established the position of the justices 
as "educational philosophers" regarding the academic 
curriculum. In this ruling, the court addressed the 
"undoubted right" of the school board to regulate its 
curriculum. The decision made it clear that: 
States, acting through local school boards, 
are possessed of power to inculcate basic community 
values in students who may not be mature enough to 
deal with academic freedom as understood or practiced 
at higher educational levels.... 
And that: 
A state has a compelling interest in assuring 
the fitness and dedication of its teachers, and it 
follows that the regulation of curriculum in the 
primary grades is likewise compelling.... 
47Ibid. 
4P E. Edmund Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, 
The Law of Public Education (Mineola, N.Y., The 
Foundation Press, Inc., 1976), p. 129. 
49 
Palmer v. Board of Education of City of 
Chicago, 466 F. Supp. 600, affirmed 603 F. 2d 1271, 
certiorari denied 100 S. Ct. 689 (1979). 
And, further that: 
Refusal to conform classroom teaching to 
prescribed curriculum is not constitutionally 
protected. 
50Ibid. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE COURTS AND THE ACADEMIC CURRICULUM 
This chapter traces the evolution of each academic 
curriculum area, through a historical review of the cases 
which are pertinent to each of the areas and through the 
presentation of a number of passages which clearly show 
the position that various justices have taken over the 
years. The academic curriculum areas which will be 
addressed are language arts, foreign language, health and 
physical education, music and art, vocational education, 
mathematics and science, and social studies. 
LANGUAGE ARTS 
The area of language arts has received a substantial 
amount of judical review over the years. 
A Vermont case in 1859^ arose when a student was expelled 
for refusal to participate in a composition exercise. The 
court upheld the expulsion, saying: 
It is not necessary to inquire into the 
propriety of extending the course of instruction 
in the common schools.... it seems very obvious 
^Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 76 Am. Dec. 171, 
(1859). 
that English composition may fairly be regarded 
as an allowable mode of teaching many of these 
branches.52 
Seventeen years later, in a similar decision, an Ohio 
court5^ upheld a school policy requiring that a student 
be prepared to give a rhetorical exercise at a parti­
cular time or, barring reason of sickness or other reasonable 
cause, be expelled from school.54 As judged by these 
initial cases, a precedent for almost unquestioned school 
control in language arts appears to have been set. 
However, in an 1877 case before the Supreme Court of 
Illinois55, the court ruled against the school board, 
stating that, although the board was charged with the 
responsibility for curriculum choice, "this authority 
to determine the subjects to be taught did not mean 
authority to determine what a particular pupil would 
study."5^ This was one of the first decisions to "recog­
nize the parent's right to determine to what extent his child 
52Ibid. 
5^Sewell v. Board of Education of Defiance Union 
School, 29 Ohio St., 89 (1876). 
54Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 65. 
55 Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen, 
87 111., 303, 29 Am. Rep. 55 (1877). 
C /• 
Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 62. 
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shall be educated, presuming his natural affections and 
superior opportunities of knowing....his child ....will.... 
57 
promote the child's welfare." 
This ruling against the school board did not establish 
a trend, however, because just a year after the Van Allen 
58 
decision, in another Illinois case of 1878 , the court ruled 
that the refusal of a teacher to hear a student's recitations 
was legitimate, even though the reason for the refusal to 
hear the student stemmed from the student's unwillingness to 
practice lessons in penmanship which the teacher required. 
Shortly after this, the courts again seemed to do an 
59 
about-face when, in an 1879 New Hampshire court decision , 
the court upheld the expulsion of a pupil who would not 
give a declamation exercise. In its opinion, the court 
stated that allowing "the power of parents to decide the 
question of what studies should be pursued would disorganize 
the school and render it substantially useless."^® 
In an 1891 case^, a Nebraska court upheld the right 
of a parent to make curriculum selections by allowing the 
^Trustees of Schools v. People ex rel. Van Allen. 
C O  
Stuckey v. Churchman, 2 111. App. 584, (1878). 
^Kidder v. Chellis, 59NH473 (1879). 
6 0 
Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 64. 
61 
State ex rel. Shiebley v. School District No. 1 
of Dixon County, 31 Neb. 522, 48NW393 (1891). 
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daughter of an upset father to be excused from the study of 
grammar and reinstated in school. Giving an opinion quite 
similar to that in the 1877 Illinois case, the court stated: 
The father certainly possesses superior 
opportunities of knowing the physical and mental 
capabilities of his child....the right of the parent 
to determine which studies his child shall pursue, is 
paramount to that of the trustee or teacher ....No 
pupil attending the school can be compelled to study 
any prescribed branch against the protest of the 
parent.... and any rule or regulation which requires 
such is unreasonable and arbitrary.... there is no 
good reason why the failure of one or more pupils 
to study one or more prescribed branches should 
result disastrously to the proper discipline, 
efficiency, and well-being of the school."62 
A Georgia court in 19006-* again reversed the trend and 
upheld the expulsion of a student whose father refused to 
let her participate in a debate, by ruling that 
the authorities of a public school have full 
power to make it a part of the school course to 
write compositions and enter debates....whether a 
particular subject given....for debate is suited 
to the age and advancement of the pupil is a 
question for determination by (school) authorities, 
and not by the courts."64 
Finally, in 1908, a trend began to emerge, as illus­
trated by a 1908 Kentucky court decision6^ supporting a school 
Samual Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 
111 Ga. 801, 36SE920 (1900). 
^^Ibid. 
^Cross v. Trustees of Walton Graded School, 
129 Ky. 35, 110SW346 (1908). 
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ruling which required pupils to take part in commencement 
exercises. A student who refused a particular part in the 
exercise was suspended and would not accept another part in 
6 ft order to be reinstated. The ruling by the court upheld 
the suspension of the pupil and became a victory in the 
effort toward acquisition of a school-determined curriculum. 
The right of the school district to determine the 
language arts curriculum was upheld, once more, in a 1929 
Kansas case.6*7 in that decision the court not only supported 
the school board in its effort to add drama to the curriculum, 
but also specified the right of the school district to 
construct an additionl building suitable for dramatic 
activities. 
Two western cases cropped up in 1974 from California 
and New Mexico. In the California case, which ended up in 
Q 
the United States Supreme Court , the opinion dictated that all 
Chinese students in the San Francisco schools must receive 
instruction in English, thus striking down a discriminatory 
school board policy. This ruling was interesting in that 
6*>Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 64. 
f i  7  
Woodson v. School District No. 28, Kingman Co., 
127 Kan. 651, 274 Pac. 728 (1929). 
^®Lau v. Nichols, 414 US 563, 94 S. Ct. 786, 
31 L.Ed. 2dl (1974). 
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the decision was based upon Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare guidelines concerning elimination of language 
barriers, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.^ 
The ruling in the New Mexico case came out of the 
70 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and was quite similar to 
the San Francisco case. In this case, it was ruled that 
Spanish-surnamed students should receive English instruction 
to raise achievement scores and lower the dropout rate. 
In order to accomplish 'this, a type of bilingual program 
was ordered.^1 
Litigation since 1974 in the area of language arts 
has revolved around the issues of bilingual education and 
the teaching of standard English to black students. 
A ruling which came as the result of a 1975 Colorado 
case^ concerned bilingual/bicultural education. The 
justices in this early bilingual education case affirmed 
the ruling that there is no constitutional right to bi­
lingual/bicultural education. As will be seen, however, 
subsequent cases established a differing point of view. 
69 
Reutter and Hamilton, p. 132. 
7 n 
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F. 3d 
1147 (10 cir. 1974). 
71 Reutter and Hamilton, p. 132. 
72 
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District, No. 
51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (1975). 
In a 1975 desegregation case^, the court ruled that a 
Massachusetts school department would be obligated to 
provide bilingual instruction to twenty or more kindergarten 
students, if it were established that the students needed 
the instruction. 
In an interesting New York case, which also arose in 
197574t a question came up concerning the requirement of a 
bilingual program for Spanish-speaking students and the 
criteria to be used for inclusion of students in the program 
The court ruled that the bilingual program must be provided 
and would be required for any Hispanic student who scored at 
or below twenty percent on the English version of the 
language assessment tests. The court further ruled that 
any Hispanic students who scored higher on the Spanish 
reference test than on the English reference test must also 
be included in the bilingual program. 
^Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, stay denied 
523 F. 2d 917, affirmed 530 F. 2d 401, certiorari denied 
McDonough v. Morgan, 96 S. Ct. 2648, 426 U.S. 935, 49 
L.Ed. 386 and White v. Morgan, 96 Set. 2648, 426 U.S. 
935, 49 L.Ed. 2d 386, certiorari denied Boston Home and 
School Ass'n v. Morgan, 96 S. Ct. 2649, 426 U.S. 935, 
49 L.Ed. 2d 386, rehearing denied 97 S. Ct. 193, 429 
U.S. 873, 50 L.Ed. 2d 156 (1975). 
74 
Aspxra of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education 
of City of New York, 394 F. Supp. 1161 (1975). 
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The trend of requiring some type of bilingual educa-
7  S  
tion was continued, when an Arizona court, in 1978' , 
weighed the question of an elementary school1s providing 
English language instruction to non-English-speaking students. 
In this case, the court ruled that a formal bilingual/bicultural 
education program did not have to be established by the 
school district, so long as effective and appropriate 
measures were developed to substantially improve the language 
deficiencies of the non-English-speaking students. 
The final case which can be used to trace the evolution 
of the language arts area of the curriculum came out of a 
7  6  
Michigan court in 1979. The question in this case involved 
the teaching of standard English to black students and 
the failure of teachers in the school system to take into 
account the home language system of the black students in 
question. The ruling which resulted from this situation 
made it clear that the school district was obligated to 
provide an instructional program, expressly designed to 
eliminate the language barrier. Further, the court ruled 
that teachers should be instructed by the School Board and 
the administration in teaching methods which would recognize 
75 
Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary 
School District No. 3, 587, F. 2d 1022 (1978). 
7 6 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School Children 
v. Ann Arbor School District Board of Education, 473 
F. Supp. 1371 (1979). 
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the home language system of the black students and would 
help to successfully overcome the language deficiencies 
which the students exhibited. 
Historically, court cases concerning language arts 
did not reach a consistent thrust until about 1900. It was 
only then that this area began to be regarded as essential 
to the overall school program, with compulsory participation 
for all pupils. In fact, as demonstrated in the California, 
New Mexico, Massachusetts, New York, Arizona, and Michigan 
cases, the schools were chastised for not providing all pupils 
equal opportunity in the language arts area. Obviously, 
language arts, as a regular and required part of the curriculum, 
was here to stay. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that although the 
courts have plainly established the legislature and school 
board as capable of and responsible for decision-making in 
the area of language arts, those same courts have made it 
abundantly clear that corporal punishment and expulsion 
are not appropriate alternatives in cases of parental 
demand that a child not study courses in this area. 
As this study probes cases in additional academic 
areas, it will become increasingly clear that the courts, 
both historically and at present, adhere to this non-
punishment philosophy. The next section considers trends 
in the area of foreign language and notes similarities 
and differences in the curriculum rulings which were made 
by the courts. 
FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
One of the first cases in the area of foreign language 
was the famous 1874 Kalamazoo case77, in which the Supreme 
Court of Michigan held that a local board, in the absence of 
express legislative authority, did have the power to main­
tain a high school7®. This power had been disputed on the 
grounds that foreign languages were being taught and that 
those courses were supported in the high school by public 
tax money. As stated, however, the plaintiffs were not 
successful in their plea. 
A second case of note occurred in 18817^ and was 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Illinois. In this 
particular case, the justices adhered to the same tenet as 
in the Kalamazoo case. The ruling was more specific, how­
ever, emphasizing that, "while the medium of any communica­
tion must be the English language, the teaching of a modern 
80 
foreign language could not be prohibited." 
77Stuart v. School Dist. No. 1 of Kalamazoo, 
30 Mich. 69 (1874). 
78 
Reutter and Hamilton, p. 128. 
79 
Powell v. Board of Education of Illinois, 
97 Oil. 375 Am. Rep. 123 (1881). 
8 0 Fullbright and Bolmeier, p. 51. 
A Missouri court in 1883®! ruled similarly to the 1874 
Kalamazoo case/ stating that the legislature had empowered 
the city to use tax funds as it saw fit. Therefore, 
foreign language teaching was appropriate, since the school 
officials had deemed it so. 
A case involving foreign language proved of interest 
op 
in a Kentucky court (1887) , since the case involved 
Latin and Greek, not generally considered "modern languages 
The court opined that the teaching of these languages was 
not a violation of the law and that, "if the ordinary 
branches of education are taught and the school open to all 
the fact that the teacher may have a class in Latin or 
Greek should not.... authorize an injunction against him to 
prevent it."83 
In 18918^, and again in 189385, cases were litigated 
in Indiana and Kansas respectively, concerning the teaching 
of German. In the first case, parents were successful in 
petitioning the board of education through the courts, in 
order that German would become a part of an elementary 
school's curriculum. 
8"*"Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 77 Mo. 484 (1883) 
o o 
Newman v. Thompson, 9 Ky. 199 ASW341 (1887). 
83Ibid. 
84 Board of School Comm'rs of Indiana v. State, 
129 Ind. 14, 28NE61 (1891). 
85 Board of Education of Topeka v. Welch, 51 Kan. 
792, 33 Pac. 654 (1893). 
In the 1893 case, the court ruled (as it had in the 
Powell case) that the teaching of German was permissible 
as long as the medium for instruction in the course were 
English. 
In a case strikingly similar to the 1891 Indiana case, 
p C 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska (1916) ruled that a statute 
concerning provision of German at the request of fifty 
parents was indeed constitutional and must be honored. It 
was becoming more and more clear that the parents were hav­
ing a heavy and beneficial influence upon subject matter 
offered their children. 
To explain the most important of the foreign language 
87 
cases , a quotation from Edward Bolmeier is used. He states 
The most noteworthy foreign language case 
was that of Meyer v. Nebraska. It was the 
first and only case on the issue which reached 
the United States Supreme Court. The factors 
leading up to the case indicate that, after 
World War I, a number of states enacted legis­
lation prohibiting the teaching of German to 
non-public and public school pupils. Although 
the courts of three states (Nebraska, Iowa and Ohio) 
had sanctioned the legislation as a legitimate 
exercise of the police power, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the legislation was an arbitrary 
interference with the liberty of parents to 
control and educate their children, and with 
the liberty of teachers to pursue their lawful 
or 
State ex rel. Thayer v. School District of 
Nebraska City, 99 Neb. 338, 156NW641 (1916). 
87 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US390, 37 L.Ed. 43 
St. Ct. 625 (1923). 
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calling, and that it violated the liberty guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.88 
This landmark decision in the foreign language area not 
only established a precedent to be followed by legislatures 
and school boards, but in addition placed the United States 
Supreme Court justices squarely in the position of educational 
philosophers. Through this ruling, the court demanded that 
appropriate educational opportunities be afforded the public, 
regardless of environmental, political, or social variables. 
Indeed, this was a vital decision, not only for foreign 
languages, but for education in general. 
Another interesting case concerning the foreign language 
area was litigated in 1934 in a Florida court.In this 
case, the court dismissed a petition by a student to drop 
a course in Latin, stating that "aggrieved parties in school 
affairs must carry their complaints through the hierarchy of 
school authorities before controversies can be heard by the 
court. 
91 A foreign language case which arose in 1973 , was 
strikingly similar to the bilingual case (Colorado, 1975) , 
o g 
Edward C. Bolmeier, School and the Legal Structure, 
Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1974), p. 283. 
89Ruff v. Fisher, 115 Fla. 247, 15580642 (1934). 
90 
Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 54. 
91 Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813, affirmed in 
part, reversed in part 516 F. 2nd. 411, certiorari denied 
96 S. Ct. 566, 423 U.S. 1034, 46 L.Ed. 2d 408 (1973). 
described in the previous section on language arts. In this 
1973 case, the justices ruled that the Constitution of the 
United States does not guarantee to groups of foreign origin 
an instructional program taught in the foreign language 
native to the group in question. The decision further 
established that the percentage of foreign students in the 
school district, even if the percentage constituted a 
majority, did not entitle the students to instruction in 
their own language. And finally, the decision proposed 
that the failure of the school district to accept federal 
aid, in solving its language deficiency problems, did not 
constitute bad faith or serve as prima facie evidence of 
discrimination. 
Another foreign language case cropped up in a New York 
court m 1974J , when a question arose concerning the freedom 
of the school board to develop curriculum, especially with 
regard to foreign language courses. In this case, the 
court ruled that the school board had the right to develop 
curriculum, if the curriculum did not lead to or involve 
illegal segregation of pupils. Beyond that point, the court 
further ruled that courses in the school curriculum must be 
organized in such a manner that there be no discrimination 
against students; the addition of a foreign language was 
legitimate. 
^Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn 
New York School District No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699, 
appeal dismissed 497 F. 2d. 1027, affirmed 512 F. 2d 37 (1974) 
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Two cases surfaced in 1979, which serve as final 
illustrations of rulings in the foreign language area. In 
the first of these cases^3, a Louisiana appellate court 
ruling declared a state statute requiring the development 
and operation of a foreign language program to be inoperable, 
because there were not any available state funds to finance 
the program. In the second case^, a Pennsylvania court 
ruled that an overall percentage decline in student enrollment 
in foreign language courses and especially in German courses, 
could not be ruled as unacceptable evidence that the German 
language programs should be modified or eliminated. This 
was an interesting ruling by the court in light of the fact 
that some of the students who were affected by the curtail­
ment of the German courses had been enrolled in the German 
curriculum since it was initially offered. 
The trend in the foreign language area, as judged by 
the above cases and with only minor exception, is characterized 
by a rather striking consistency in judicial interpretation. 
As was true in the language arts area, state legislatures 
and school boards have been strongly upheld by the courts 
in their efforts to include foreign languages in the 
academic curriculum. 
^3Faul v. Superintendent of Education, 367 So. 2d 
1267 (1979). 
94 
Penzenstadler v. Avonworth School District, 403 
A. 2d 621 (1979). 
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HEALTH AND PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
One of the most frequently litigated areas of the 
curriculum has been that of health and physical education. 
This may be attributable to the fact that traditionally the 
public schools were thought of as mind-training institutions, 
and, upon the inclusion of health and physical education in 
the regular curriculum, parental questions and confusion as to 
the role of the school led to court actions being filed. 
One of the first cases in this area came out of an Iowa 
Court in 1906^ concerning a school board decision to delete 
the playing of football from school physical education 
activities, because of the dangers involved in that particular 
sport. In the decision, the court ruled that since the school 
did not support a number of other physical activities (baseball, 
track, etc.) and because a statute gave the school board 
"authority to make rules and regulations for the government 
Q C 
of pupils," that the board did, indeed, have the right to 
make such a decision. 
In 1910, a Minnesota Court^ ruled that personnel 
could be hired to implement a health program designed to 
function in a diagnostic capacity. In the decision, the 
court stated: 
^Kinzer v. Directors of Independence School District 
of Marion, 129 Iowa 441, 105 NW686 (1906). 
96Ibid. 
97 
State ex rel. Stoltenberg v. Brown, 122 Minn., 
370, 128NW294 (1910). 
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It seems that the school authorities coming 
directly in contact with the children should have 
an accurate knowledge of each child's physical 
condition, for the benefit of the individual 
child, for the protection of other children with 
reference to communicable diseases and conditions, 
and to permit an intelligent grading of the pupils.98 
This 1910 case is important, because it set a precedent 
quite early for better health programs in public schools. 
A Colorado court in 192099 ruled similarly but added a more 
explicit guideline that annual inspections of sight, hearing 
and breathing were entirely permissible in the eyes of the law. 
A somewhat similar case came up in the Supreme Court 
of Washington (1921)10°, when the school officials evidently 
had been excessive in their interpretation of health respon­
sibility. The court ruled that a clinic which had been 
set up at public expense for medical, surgical and dental 
treatment was beyond those necessary services which the 
court deemed reasonable. It was becoming increasingly 
clear that the courts would go along with diagnostic work 
97 State ex rel. Stoltenberg v. Brown, 122 Minn. 
370, 128NW294 T1910). 
98Ibid. 
9 9 
Hallett v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 
68 Colo. 573, 192 Pac. 658 (1920). 
1()oMcGilva v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
113 Wash. 619, 194 (1921). 
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in and supported by the schools, but would balk at actual 
treatment which superseded an inspection or first aid type 
of approach. 
Another ruling in 1921101 came out of a California 
court and proved of interest, since the issue of religious 
objections to dancing was involved. In this case, parents 
objected to the waltz, polka, and the two-step being included 
in the physical education program, and insisted that, for 
religious reasons, the students be excused from the exercise. 
The court ruled that the school board's subsequent action, 
expelling the students, was not acceptable. The opinion also 
stated, however, that the school board definitely was empowered 
to include dancing as a part of the physical education program, 
saying: 
It is also a proposition upon which there 
cannot exist any ground for legitimate controversy.... 
there should be maintained a system of physical 
education or training.... as will develop bodily 
and organic vigor in the public.... 
Several cases-*-^ concerning the provision of physical 
education and athletic facilities (gymnasium, stadium, etc.) 
-1-OlHardwick v. Board of Trustees of Fruitridge 
School District, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac. 49 (1921). 
102Ibid. 
103 Burlington ex rel. Board of School Comm'rs 
v. Mayor of Burlington, 98 Vt. 388, 127 Atl. 892 
(1925), Alexander v. Phillips, 31 Ariz. 503, 254 Pac. 
1056 (1927), McNair v. School District No. 11 of Cascade 
County, 87 Mont. 423, 288 Pac. 188 (1930). 
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came to light in the late twenties and early thirties. The 
plaintiffs in each of these cases questioned the legality 
of public fund expenditure to provide the facilities 
mentioned although the value of the physical education 
program was not a matter of contention. In each of these 
three actions, the courts ruled that the school board has 
implicit power to organize physical activity as a part of 
the school curriculum and therefore must also provide 
adequate facilities for the conducting of those activities. 
A part of the ruling in the Alexander case (1927) 
epitomized the courts' feelings in all three. It read: 
....At present, our population is urban, 
with little or no chance for physical training 
for children in the home....For this reason, the 
new generation of educators has added to the 
mental education, which was all that was given 
by the public school of the past, the proper 
training of the body, and a gymnasium is now 
accepted to be as properly a schoolhouse af is 
the chemical laboratory or the study hall.104 
The context and court opinion in the next case under 
study was similar to that in the Stoltenberg vs. Brown 
case of 1910. In this Texas case10^ of 1929, an injunction 
was sought to prohibit the maintenance of a health clinic 
in the Dallas Public Schools. In the court's opinion, which 
upheld the health clinic, the justices stated: 
104Ibid. 
^^Moseley v. Dallas, 17 SW (2d) 36 Tex. (1929). 
Modern science has conclusively established 
the fact, and the record in this case conclusively 
shows, that there is an intimate relation between 
the mind and the body....it would not only be 
injustice to the child to conduct the teaching 
process without information as to its physical 
conditions, but SUgh a system would be a waste 
of public funds. 
Two cases in the physical education area proved of 
interest in 1938. In the first of these, a Pennsylvania 
107 Appeals Court deliberated, the legality of coaching duties 
as a part of regular teaching responsibility. The Chief 
Justice stated in his comments upholding the legality of 
the coaching duty, the following: 
....physical training includes organized 
sports and athletic exercises. Athletics are 
important to the moral, physical and mental 
development of the students. 
109 
In the second 1938 case , the question involved the 
provision of athletic supplies, once again through the 
expenditure of public funds. Just as was ruled in the 
physical education facilities cases discussed earlier, the 
court supported the purchases saying: 
....athletic supplies.... are as necessary 
for school use as maps, globes, and similar 
objects. It is not the spirit of our public 
106ibid. 
1 07 
Appeal of Ganaposki, 332 Pa. 550 2A(2d) 742 (1938). 
Ibid. 
109 
Galloway v. School District of Borough of 
Prospect Park, 331 Pa. 48, 220 Atl. 99, (1938). 
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school system that only children with financial 
means to purchase their own supplies should have 
the opportunity of participating in school games 
and athletic sports.11" 
A new dimension was added to the facilities cases 
already discussed, as a 1945 case in Illinois*13" developed. 
Under contention here was not only the expenditure of public 
funds for a gymnasium, but also that the issuance and sale 
of bonds for raising that money was illegal. The court did 
not deviate in consistency, however, as it ruled that the 
raising and expenditure of money for physical education 
facilities was a legitimate power of the school board and 
that the bond issue was an appropriate method for raising 
the money which was needed. 
Another case which illustrated the trend in decisions 
involving the school board and physical education occurred 
112 in Alabama in 1962. A In this instance, parents of a female 
student requested that she be excused from the physical 
education program and be readmitted to school, after she 
had been suspended for noncompliance with school requirements 
concerning physical education dress and activities. School 
authorities had taken steps to adjust their requirements in 
110Ibid. 
Ill Moyer v. Board of Education of School District 
No. 186, 391 111. 156, 62NE(2d) 802 (1945). 
112Mitchell v. McCall, 143S(2d) 629, Ala. (1962). 
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deference to the religious beliefs of the family; the court 
felt that these efforts were adequate and the modified 
requirements acceptable. The ruling stated clearly that 
the efforts made and the reasonableness of the requirements 
superseded the objections of the parents. The suspension 
was upheld. 
113 The final case to be cited in the area of health and 
physical education was litigated in Connecticut in 1971. 
Two questions were at the core of the dispute which 
brought this case to the attention of the court: 
How should the words "shall be", in a state 
statute, be interpreted? 
Were compulsory health and physical education 
courses arbitrary or unreasonable?114 
The court ruled, regarding the first question, that 
"shall be" should be interpreted as "may be" in regard to 
the provision of health and physical education courses by 
the State Board of Education. 
On the second question, the court ruled that the 
compulsory nature of and the alternatives offered in the 
health education curriculum, did not constitute any arbitrar­
iness or unreasonableness, and that the health and physical 
education courses could be required. 
11^ Hopkins v. Hamden Board of Education, 289 
A. 2d 914, 29 Conn. Sup. 397 (1971). 
114Ibid. 
46 
As concluded from the case rulings in this section on 
health and physical education, the courts have shown con­
sistency in their decisions. The rulings have upheld the 
inclusion of physical education in the curriculum, the 
provision of diagnostic and emergency health facilities, 
the expenditure of public funds for facilities and equipment, 
and the imperative nature of attendance in required physical 
education activities. These decisions leave no doubt that 
the courts view health and physical education not only 
important, but as a vital facet of the curriculum. 
MUSIC AND ART 
Over the years there have been a number of cases 
litigated in the area of music. The first one which will 
115 
be discussed arose in the Iowa Supreme Court in 1876. 
In this case and in a later Kansas action (1916)116, the 
courts upheld the right and authority of the public school 
officials to hire a music teacher with public funds. The 
opinion in the 1916 case read, in part: 
It is within the discretion of the school 
board to determine whether all subjects, including 
music, shall be taught by a single teacher or to 
I "I E 
Bellmeyer v. Independent School District of 
Marshalltown, 44 Iowa 564 (1876). 
116Epley v. Hall, 97 Kan. 549, 155 Pac. 1083 
(1916). 
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provide that music shall be taught by another 
teacher, provided such other possesses the 
qualifications and authority required by school 
laws. 
In 1886, a father attempted to exercise his power of 
choice in subject matter for his son by having him refuse 
to participate in required music activities. In contradiction 
118 
to rulings forementioned, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld 
the expulsion of the student by the superintendent and 
opined: 
We are of the opinion that the rule of 
regulation....was within the discretionary 
power conferred by law....that it was such a 
one as each pupil of the high school, in the 
absence of sufficient excuse, might lawfully 
be required to obey and comply with. 
In reviewing this case the phrase "in the absence of 
sufficient excuse" was the basis for the ruling which 
abrogated the parent's demands; no "sufficient excuse" was 
provided. 
120 In 1901, an Indiana court tackled the issue of 
public funds providing for music charts in the public 
schools. The question had arisen because music, by state 
statute, had not been included as one of the branches of 
H^Ibid. 
1 1 Q 
State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 
8NE708 (1886). 
119Ibid. 
120 
Myers Publishing Company v. White River School 
Township, 28 Ind. App. 91, 62NE66 (1901). 
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study required by law. The court ruled that although music 
was not specifically mentioned in the state statutes as a 
course of study, the trustees had a right to direct the 
addition of courses to the curriculum. 
In 1909, an Oklahoma Court^-22 ruled that the right of a 
parent to have his children excluded from required singing 
lessons superseded the authority of the school to place them 
in the program. In this opinion, the court stated that: 
.... the right of the parent in that regard 
is superior to that of the school....the parents 
could make a reasonable selection from the course 
of study prescribed by the proper school authorities. " 
In another interesting case litigated in 1935, a 
California court^24 became involved after a school board 
had eliminated music from the curriculum and subsequently 
released the music teacher. When the teacher brought action 
asking reinstatement as a fulltime music instructor, she 
was sustained by the courts on the grounds that the school 
board could not delete music from the curriculum and remain 
in compliance with the existing state statutes. 
121 Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 66. 
122 School Board of District No. 18 v. Thompson, 
24 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578 (1909). 
123 
Ibid. 
12^Jones v. Board of Trustees of Culver City School 
District No. 8, Cal. App. (2d) 146, 47 P (2d) 804 (1935). 
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Another case which demonstrates the evolution of the 
music curriculum in the public schools is enhanced by 
a bit of domestic intrigue. Litigated in an Iowa court in 
196l125, the case involved disgruntled cousins whose bene­
factor, a deceased relative, had left a bequest for the pro­
motion of vocal music instruction in kindergarten, first 
and second grade in the Iowa public schools. In upholding 
the validity of the bequest, the court ruled that the 
promotion of music was within the existing power of the 
state; thus, the greedy cousins lost! 
The final case to be reviewed in the area of music 
was ruled upon in a New Hampshire court in 1974.126 In this 
case, the ruling established that there are some constitu­
tionally protected rights in the areas of classroom activi­
ties and programs which children have that are not 
necessarily the same as those of their parents. In addition, 
the court ruled that the parents failed to prove that 
required music in the school curriculum violated constitu­
tional rights or prohibited their exercise of religion. 
12^Eckles v. Lounsberry, 111 NW (2d) 638 (Iowa 1961). 
"^^Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (1974). 
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Although rulings in the area of music have been some­
what inconsistent, it has been clearly established that the 
state may add music as a subject area; that, if provided 
for in statutes, music may not be deleted through arbitrary 
decision by school boards; and that public money may be 
expended in support of music programs. 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
The area of vocational education has received a sub­
stantial share of court attention over the years, with one 
of the first actions in this area being ruled upon in 1875. 
127 In this case, an Illinois Court was faced with another 
"parental choice of subject" type of situation. The school 
had added bookkeeping to the curriculum, although this was 
not prescribed in state statutes. Upon the student's refusal 
to take the course (at the direction of her parents), she 
was expelled. The court subsequently ruled that the school 
did have the right to add bookkeeping to the curriculum 
but did not have the authority to expel the student, since 
she and her parents had the right to decide her course of 
study. 
Another case of interest came out of a Wisconsin 
128 Court in 1910, closely followed by an Illinois decision 
127Rulison v. Post, 79 111, 567 (1875). 
128Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 NW 899 (1910). 
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of a similar nature in 1912. Both cases centered 
around the school board's authority to establish manual 
training programs in the absence of express state statutes. 
In each of the cases, the courts upheld the addition of the 
courses to the program, and established the fact that 
buildings could be constructed for vocational subjects with 
public funds. 
1  T O  
In 1913, however, the Kansas Supreme Court v tempo­
rarily set back progress in the vocational subject area by 
an opinion which was contradictory to the 1910 Wisconsin 
decision. In this case, the court assumed a negative 
role, ruling that a school board did not have the authority 
to acquire land or construct buildings solely for the 
purpose of establishing vocational or commercial programs. 
This decision was accompanied, however, by another 
much more positive 1913 ruling out of a Minnesota court. 
In this case, the court strongly supported the right of 
the state legislature to make policy establishing vocational 
education as part of the curriculum. In the ruling, the 
court stated: 
-'-^People ex rel. McKeever v. Board of Education of 
Drummer Township High School, 176 111. App. 491 (1912). 
•^•^Board of Education of Nickerson v. Davis, 90 Kan. 
621, 135 Pac. 604 (1913). 
^Associated Schools of Independent School District 
No. 63 v. School District No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142NW325 
(1913) . 
It is the judgment of the legislature that 
this state should now require public education 
in something more than the common branches.... 
The question whether the population and wealth 
of the state are such as to warrant such measures 
is a legislative and not a judicial question....*32 
In 1914*33f the Nebraska Supreme Court felt that a 
parent should have the right to choose a course of studies 
for his child. In this case, the father objected to his 
daughter studying domestic science, because of a technical 
time-wasting policy concerning logistics and dismissal from 
school. The court did sustain the parent's request, rein­
stated the girl in school, and ruled, in part: 
They (the school) should exercise their 
authority over and desire to further the best 
interests of their scholars, with a due regard 
for the desires and inborn solicitudes of the 
parents of such children.*34 
In a 1925XJ Iowa action, litigation was brought to 
mandate vocational education programs in the graded schools. 
After evidence was presented, the court ruled that the 
school board was in compliance with the district electoral 
dictum, since bookkeeping was already required of all pupils 
132ibid. 
1 
State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 
k44NWl039 (1914). 
134lbid. 
135 
Neilan v. Board of Directors of Independent 
School District of Sioux City, 200 Iowa 860, 205 NW 
506 (1926). 
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in the seventh and eighth grades and that all materials 
pertinent to that instruction were present and being utilized 
in the classrooms. 
The study of thrift came up as a topic of contention 
during a 1926 session of the Supreme Court of Iowa.*3*' In 
this case, not only was the course itself questioned, but 
so also was a course policy that students' money must be 
deposited in a bank. The court ruled that: 
....It is, we think, clearly within the power 
of the board of directors of a school corporation 
to determine whether or not such a course of study 
shall be prescribed for the public school or the 
corporation or whether it shall be maintained or not. 
The General Assembly....has left the matter of 
determining and prescribing the courses of study 
as to all other matters (concerning methodology, 
etc.) within the power and the discretion of the 
board of directors. 
Cases in 1933^3® and 1934139 proved interesting to the 
evolution of vocational education in the curriculum, 
although the two cases approached similar issues from oppos­
ing corners. In the 1933 case, out of a California court, 
*| or 
Security National Bank of Mason City v. Bagley, 
202 Iowa 701, 210NW947 (1926). 
137 x Ibid. 
-*-3®Bates v. Escondido Union High School of San 
Diego County, 133 Cal. App. 725, 24 P(2d) 884 (1933). 
1 *39 
School District of Borough of Fall Creek v. 
School District of Washington Township, 114 Pa. Super., 
174 Atl. 643 (1934). 
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the ruling supported the authority of a board of education 
to conduct agriculture instruction during the regular or 
summer sessions. The Pennsylvania case in 1934, also 
supported a school district's right to implement vocational 
education as "a part" of the school program but insisted 
that the district must also comply with the statutes of the 
state and provide for a general education for all children 
in the district. 
In a constitutional challenge in 1962 a taxpayer 
insisted that provision of vocational education 
programs was not legal. The Supreme Court of Arkansas^4*) 
ruled that not only was the provision of such courses a 
legal power of the state legislature but, in addition, that 
"the scope of activities in the school may be directed toward 
training the mental, moral, or physical powers and 
faculties."141 
Another case which can illustrate the evolution of 
vocational education as a curriculum area occurred in 
1971142 in West Virginia. This was an interesting 
^^Hooker v. Parkin, 357 SW(2d) 534, Ark. (1962). 
141 Fulbright and Bolmeier, p. 42. 
^42State ex rel. Board of Education of Kanawha 
v. Dyer, 179SE(2d)577, W. Va. (1971). 
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example of litigation because competition and private 
enterprise entered into the issues at hand. A school board 
had received permission from the State Committee of Barbers 
and Beauticians to operate a school of beauty culture as a 
part of the vocational program. Proceeding with plans, 
the school hired teachers, equipped the facility, and enrolled 
forty pupils for the course. At that point, however, school 
officials were amazed to find the license refused by the 
committee, which had been approached by private beauty school 
operators. As the Supreme Court of West Virginia inves­
tigated, it was discovered that a member of that state 
committee owned a beauty parlor and had voted rejection of 
the application to prevent competition with his personal 
enterprise. The court ruled that the committee had been 
arbitrary and capricious, and instructed the issuance of 
the license forthwith. Thus, another interesting and 
powerful blow was struck for vocational education as a 
legitimate part of the public school curriculum. 
In a 1975 Pennsylvania action!43 involving vocational 
education, questions arose concerning the inclusion of a 
required vocational course in the curriculum and the 
obligation of parents to enroll children in the vocational 
•'•^Comm. ex rel. School District of Pittsburg v. 
Ross, 330 A. 2d 290, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 105 (1975). 
course in question. In resolving these issues, the court 
ruled that even though state statutes did not require 
vocational education courses, the State Board of Education 
could require such training. The court then elaborated 
upon the ruling, establishing that parents could not 
withhold children from attending vocational education 
classes, merely because the school did not require the 
classes as a part of the curriculum. 
The final case ruling, which demonstrates the trend 
over the years in the area of vocational education, evolved 
from a 1976 situation in Ohio.^44 The decision of the 
court was quite comprehensive in this instance of litiga­
tion, and spoke to three aspects of the case. They were: 
Job training should be one of the most 
important parts of the high school curriculum; 
The Ninth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution was not violated by the establishing 
of a vocational education program; 
Present day living skills should be taught 
as a part of the school curriculum. Vocational 
education courses provided experiences and know­
ledge which qualified as present day living skills.145 
144Mercure v. Board of Education of Columbiana 
School District, 361 N.E. 2d 273, 49 Ohio App. 2d 
409, 3 0.03d 466 (1976). 
145Ibid. 
57 
The view of the courts concerning vocational educa­
tion has traditionally correspondended to their leanings in 
the music area. Some court rulings dictated that parents 
had the right to choose whether their children would be 
included in the courses or not. Rulings, however, invariably 
supported the power of the legislature or school boards 
to implement programs, legalized the spending of funds for 
provision of teachers for those programs, and gave approval 
for the acquisition of land and buildings to be used in 
vocational education. The stance of the courts regarding 
vocational arts may best be summarized by the following: 
The school trustees of a high school have 
authority to classify and grade the scholars in 
the district and cause them to be taught in such 
departments as they may deem excellent; they may 
also prescribe the courses of study and textbooks 
for the use of the school and such reasonable 
rules and regulations as they may think needed. 
They may also require prompt attendance, respectful 
deportment, and diligence in study.146 
MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE 
Perhaps because of their objective nature and evident 
relevance to life and society, the areas of mathematics and 
science (except in cases involving evolution) have been 
infrequently questioned concerning their acceptability in 
14®State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 
144 NW 1039 (1914). 
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the public schools. The one mathematics case which is 
discussed here occurred in an Iowa court (1878)^7 and con­
cerned a requirement that algebra be studied as a part of the 
regular school curriculum. Backed by her father, a student 
refused to study algebra and would not participate in 
class activities. The teacher of the algebra course not 
only refused to accept the father's and daughter's reasoning 
in the matter, but also corporally punished the girl for 
her lack of participation. In its ruling, the court upheld 
the inclusion of algebra as a subject in the curriculum, 
but established the corporal penalty as inappropriate. The 
court ruled that the girl should have been expelled. 
The science cases which have been litigated over the 
years have centered around the theory of evolution. 
Because this topic is so important to curriculum develop­
ment, and because of the volume of literature associated 
with it, it must be investigated and developed through a 
separate dissertation. Evolution is not dealt with in 
this study, in hopes that it will be fully explained by 
another researcher. 
1^7State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145, 32 Am. Rep. 128 
(1878). 
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SOCIAL STUDIES 
Although the majority of cases in the area of social 
studies have involved issues such as flag salutes and 
oaths of allegiance, there have been a few cases of note 
concerning the actual place of social studies in the 
curriculum. One of these cases came out of an 1874 litiga­
tion in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.148 A parent ques­
tioned the requirement by a school that pupils take 
geography as a part of the compulsory social studies 
curriculum, and refused to let his son take the geography 
mentioned. Subsequent punishment of the pupil for refusing 
to participate ended up in action being brought. In its 
opinion, the court upheld the right of the parent to choose 
which courses his son would take, saying: 
From the nature of the case, some choice 
must be made and some discretion be exercised 
as to the studies which the pupils shall pursue. 
The parent is quite as likely to make a wise and 
judicious selection as the teacher.... their (the 
school's) power and duties can well be fulfilled 
without denying to the parent all right to control 
the education of his children.149 
The second and final case which will be scrutinized 
in this area of social studies involved a course in civil 
148Morron v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 17 Am. Rep. 471 
(1874). 
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government. As a course requirement, it was prescribed 
that pupils make presentations in the roles of various 
government officials. When a girl in the class was 
assigned the role of a policeman to portray, she refused 
and was subsequently suspended from school; the case came 
before a Massachusetts court in 1912.150 The ruling carried 
a two-fold implication: the school was castigated for not 
holding a proper hearing to decide on a more appropriate 
penalty, and the course requirement was deemed as reason­
able and justified. 
Despite the fact that curriculum litigation 
in the area of social studies has been infrequent, this 
area does stand affirmed as a worthwhile addition to school 
activities and programs. 
•^^Jones v. Fitchburg, 97 NE 612, Mass. (1912). 
CHAPTER IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF LANDMARK 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV presents an analysis 
decisions in each area of the public 
curriculum. The areas and the cases 
1. Language Arts 
Guernsey v. Pitkin (1859) 
2. Foreign Language 
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 
3* Health and Physical Education 
Hardwick v. Board of Trustees of Fruitridge 
School District (1921) 
4. Music and Art 
Jones v. Board of Trustees of Culver City 
Schools (1935) 
5. Vocational Education 
State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson (1914) 
6. Mathmetics and Science 
State v. Mizner (1878) 
DECISIONS 
of landmark court 
school academic 
are listed below: 
7. Social Studies 
Jones v. Fitchburg (1912) 
The cases listed above were selected because of the 
legal precedents which were set by the decisions rendered 
in each instance of litigation. In each of the cases, 
the court weighed the rights and interests of the plaintiff, 
and defendant, and ruled according to the prevalent 
judicial trend at that particular time. 
Language Arts 
Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 76 AM. Dec. 171 (1859) 
Overview 
The court, in this case, was primarily concerned with 
answering three basic questions: (1) Was the requirement 
by a school board (and teachers) for pupils to participate 
in grammar composition exercises reasonable? (2) Was a 
request from parents for exemption of a student from the 
exercises legitimate? (3) Was the punishment given to the 
student for lack of participation reasonable and proper? 
Facts 
George H. Guernsey was an 18-year-old student who 
lived with his father and attended school in the 
district which was later to become defendant in the case. 
63 
The prudential committee of the school district hired a 
teacher who, near the beginning of the school term, 
established a requirement that all scholars must write and 
participate in grammar composition exercises. Although all 
of the others in the class complied with the composition 
requirement, George Guernsey, the plaintiff refused to 
state whether he would comply or not. At the point of his 
refusal, the teacher advised the school committee of the 
problem, whereupon the school committee notified the 
father. When next the plaintiff came to the classroom, he 
furnished neither the required composition nor a written 
request from his father that he be exempted from the 
composition requirement. When sent home again by the 
teacher, to bring such a written statement, the plaintiff 
failed to do so, and told the teacher that his father 
said, "....he had not any business with her, and if she 
had any business with him she must come and see him."151 
The teacher reported this conversation to the school 
committee, whereupon the school committee instructed the 
plaintiff that he was not any longer to attend school, unless 
he provided the required composition or brought a note 
from his father requesting that he be exempted. The 
1^1Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 86 Am. Dec. 
171 (1859). 
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committee further instructed the teacher that, in the event 
the plaintiff did attend the class, he should be ignored 
and no help or instruction should be furnished to him 
until he obeyed the regulations set down by the teacher. 
This situation continued for approximately three weeks, 
after which time the plaintiff ceased to attend classes 
and was expelled from the school. The father and son then 
brought suit against the school district prudential 
committee. 
Decision 
The lower court maintained that the requirement of 
grammar composition was reasonable and proper and that the 
teacher had made sufficient effort to induce the student 
to comply. The court also ruled that the student could 
have been legitimately excused from the participation in 
the grammar exercise if his father had furnished a written 
request to that effect. In addition, the court supported 
the defendant school committee regarding the punishment 
instituted, ruling that the expulsion of a student from 
school is reasonable consequence for the refusal to comply 
with a reasonable demand. This decision was affirmed by 
the appeals court, with Chief Justice Isaac Redfield 
presiding. 
The ruling by the Chief Justice was eloquently stated 
and will be partially cited here. He stated: 
But in regard to those branches which are 
required to be taught in the public schools, 
the prudential committee and the teachers must 
of necessity have some discretion as to the order 
of teaching them, the pupils who shall be allowed 
to pursue them, and the mode in which they shall 
be taught. If this were not so, it would be 
impossible to classify the pupils, or for one 
teacher to attend to more than ten or twelve 
pupils. 
With this concession to the teacher of 
fixing the mode of teaching these branches, 
it seems very obvious that English composition 
may fairly be regarded as an allowable mode 
of teaching many of these branches. 
and further: 
So that in regard to instruction in the 
specific branches of common school education, 
the writing of English composition in different 
forms may be regarded as an allowable mode 
of teaching the majority of them. 
There is truth and force in Lord Bacon's 
apothegm, wherein he reduces all learning 
to three processes, reading, writing and 
speaking. "Reading makes a full man, writing 
a correct man, and speaking a ready". 
Judgment affirmed.152 
Discussion 
The decision of the court in the Guernsey v. Pitkin 
case serves as the earliest and strongest precedent-setting 
ruling in the area of language arts, and prompted many 
school committees and boards of education to permanently 
152 
Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224, 76 Am. Dec. 171 
(1859). 
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install language arts as an element of the school curriculum. 
In this landmark decision, trends in several areas were 
begun. Most important, perhaps, the court clearly 
established that language arts could be instituted by 
statute as a required part of the public school academic 
curriculum and that students enrolled in such a course 
could be required to participate in the course activities. 
This portion of the ruling clearly defined the role of 
the state legislature as that of a governing body empowered 
with the right and responsibility, in the absence of 
abuse of discretion, to determine the public school 
curriculum and to delegate that authority to local boards 
of education.153 
Also of importance to future curriculum litigation 
was the decision by the court that a written excuse from the 
father of the plaintiff would have exempted the son from the 
composition requirement. As has already been evidenced by 
rulings in Chapter III, the courts would, from 1859 on, 
consistently support the right of a parent to help in 
determining how his child would be educated. 
Of no less importance was the third question spoken to 
by the justices. In this case, and in countless cases which 
followed it, the courts ruled upon the reasonable and 
153Ibid., p. 227. 
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proper nature of punishments administered to students for 
failure to comply with academic requirements. Although the 
rulings have not always been consistent, court decisions 
have generally held that the consequences for student 
noncompliance must be judged in terms of the reasonable­
ness of the activity (or subject) required, the skills and 
ability possessed by the student, and any other extenuating 
circumstances which had a bearing on the situation. In 
some cases, consequences imposed by school officials were 
supported by the courts; in others, school officials or 
boards of education were chastized for being too harsh and 
for punishing students too severely. 
Foreign Language 
Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 US 390, 
37 L.Ed. 43 S.ct. 625 (1923) 
Overview 
In the Meyer v. Nebraska case, the Supreme Court of 
the United States was concerned with several questions about 
foreign language as a part of the public school adademic 
curriculum. The questions were: (1) Was a Nebraska state 
law forbidding and limiting the teaching of foreign lan­
guage a legitimate exercise of police power? (2) Did such 
a regulatory statute abridge Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of students in the Nebraska schools? (3) Did the regula­
tory statute discriminate against a select group of 
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American citizens? (4) Could a teacher who proceeded to 
instruct students in violation of the law be legally found 
guilty and punished by the court? 
Facts 
Plaintiff Meyer was an instructor in the Zion Parochial 
School in Hamilton County, Nebraska. On or about May 25, 
1920, the plaintiff taught the subject of reading in the 
German language to Raymond Parpart, who was then ten years 
old, and who had not yet successfully passed the eighth 
grade. The State of Nebraska had, in its law and statutes, 
approved the following on April 9, 1919. The statute 
read: 
Section 1. No person, individually or as a 
teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, 
parochial or public school, teach any subject 
to any person in any language other than the 
English language. 
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English 
language, may be taught as languages only after 
a pupil shall have attained and successfully 
passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a 
certificate of graduation issued by the county 
superintendent of the county in which the child 
resides. 
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the 
provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be 
subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five 
($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) 
or be confined in the county jail for any 
period not.exceeding thirty days for each 
offense. 
l^Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 37 L.Ed. 
43 S.Ct. 625 (1923). 
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The plaintiff was arrested and tried in the county 
district court, at which trial he was subsequently con­
victed. The case was then appealed to the State Supreme 
Court of Nebraska at which time the decision was affirmed.155 
The plaintiff then appealed the judgment to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. The court heard the Meyer 
case in February, 1923 and rendered its decision in June 
of that same year. 
Decision 
The decision of the court was delivered by Justice 
McReynolds, who spoke succinctly yet eloquently to the 
four questions aforementioned in the overview. He main­
tained: 
The power of the State to compel attendance 
at some school and to make reasonable regulations 
for all schools, including a requirement that they 
shall give instructions in English, is not ques­
tioned. Nor has challenge been made of State's 
power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions 
which it supports. Those matters are not within 
the present controversy. Our concern is with the 
prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams 
v. Tanner, supra, p. 594, pointed out that mere 
abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful 
is not enough to justify its abolition, although 
regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency 
has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of 
some language other than English so clearly harm­
ful as to justify its inhibition with the con­
sequent infringement of rights long freely 
enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that 
*55Meyer v. Nebraska, 107 Neb. 657 (1923). 
the statute as applied is arbitrary and without 
reasonable relation to any end within the 
competency of the state. 
As the statute undertakes to interfere 
only with teaching which involves a modern 
language/ leaving complete freedom as to 
other matters, there seems no adequate 
foundation for the suggestion that the 
purpose was to protect the child's health 
by limiting his mental activities. It is 
well known that proficiency in a foreign 
language seldom comes to one not instructed 
at an early age, and experience shows that 
this is not injurious to the health, morals 
or understanding of the ordinary child. 
That the State may do much, go very 
far, indeed, in order to improve the quality 
of its citizens, physically, mentally and 
morally, is clear; but the individual has 
certain fundamental rights which must be 
respected. The protection of the Consti­
tution extends to all, to those who speak 
other languages as well as to those born 
with English on the tongue. Perhaps it 
would be highly advantageous if all had 
ready understanding of our ordinary 
speech, but this cannot be coerced by 
methods which conflict with the Con­
stitution—a desirable end cannot be 
promoted by prohibited means. 
Practically, education of the young 
is only possible in schools conducted 
by especially qualified persons who 
devote themselves thereto. The calling 
always has been regarded as useful and 
honorable, essential, indeed, to the 
public welfare. Mere knowledge of the 
German language cannot reasonably be 
regarded as harmful. Heretofore it 
has been commonly looked upon as helpful 
and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught 
this language in school as part of his 
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occupation. His right thus to teach and the 
right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
their children/ we think, are within the liberty 
of the Amendment. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the 
ruling of the lower courts and remanded the cause for 
further proceedings, consistent with the opinion of the 
Court.157 
Discussion 
The Meyer case, although not the first foreign language 
case litigated, certainly stands out as the most important 
for a number of reasons. 
First of all, this case clearly established the position 
of the court with regard to discrimination by state statute 
against a select group of individuals, in this case, those 
of German descent. This precedent set in 1923 has permeated 
rulings in foreign language and language arts cases from 
that time to the present. 
Second, and still of paramount importance, was the 
stance taken by the court in relation to the Fourteenth 
Amendment question. Prior to this ruling, few cases had 
addressed the question of curriculum matters and American 
156Ibid., p. 400. 
157Ibid., p. 403. 
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citizens' right to life, liberty and the pursuit of hap­
piness. This Meyer ruling went further than any case 
before it, establishing that the right to learn a foreign 
language at any age was a liberty granted by the Consti­
tution and one which could not be arbitrarily taken by a 
state statute. 
The court established, in a third important area, that 
a teacher has a property right to his vocation, even if that 
vocation involves the teaching of foreign language. This 
part of the ruling was precedent setting in that it spoke 
to the areas of academic freedom and the property rights 
of teachers. 
This landmark decision in the foreign language area 
not only established a clear precedent for legislatures 
and school boards to follow; it placed the justices in 
the position of educational philosophers, establishing 
that appropriate educational opportunities were a right 
of the public, regardless of environmental, political or 
social variables. This decision was vital, not only to 
the foreign language area, but to education in general. 
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Health and Physical Education 
Hardwick v. Board of Trustees of Fruitridge 
School District, 54 Cal, App. 696, 
205 Pac 49 (1921) 
Overview 
The court was asked to address several pertinent 
curriculum issues in this case, with the issues centering 
around the often litigated question of curriculum content 
and the right of school boards to establish a particular 
facet of learning as a part of the curriculum. The issues 
addressed in this case were: (1) Is the school board legally 
empowered to install physical education (and particularly, 
dancing) as a part of the school curriculum? (2) Must a 
parent who opposes dancing in public schools be a member of 
a religious organization or profess religious beliefs? 
(3) Must the opinion of parents be allowed consideration in 
matters of the discipline and education of their children? 
(4) How are dances such as the waltz, polka, foxtrot 
and other round dances classified? (5) May a school 
board expel a student for refusing to participate in dance 
exercises? 
Facts 
This case was appealed from the Superior Court of 
Sacramento County, California, and heard by the District 
Court of Appeals, Third District, California, on October 28 
1921. The plaintiff (and appellant), named C. C. Hardwick, 
was the father of Irma Hardwick, age 13, and Douglas 
Hardwick, age 9, who attended school in the Fruitridge 
school district in Sacramento County, California. 
A part of the school curriculum, the physical 
education course, included dancing exercises called 
Ace of Diamonds, Minuet, Norwegian Mountain March, 
and Children's Polka. C. C. Hardwick and his wife, 
Florence, objected to their children participating in 
the dance exercises, on the grounds that the exercises 
included "up-to-date"158 dancing on a "regular dance 
floor,"IS9 an(j that the dance exercises in question 
required their children to behave in a fashion which 
was "offensive to the conscientious scruples and 
contrary to the religious beliefs and principles of the 
said children and of plaintiff and his said wife."1*'0 The 
plaintiff and his wife entreated the school officials to 
institute some alternative form of exercise for their child 
ren in lieu of the dancing. Despite this parental request, 
^^Hardwick v> Board of Trustees of Fruitridge 
School District, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 Pac 49 (1921). 
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the school officials, including the board of trustees, 
insisted upon the children's participation under the 
threat of explusion from the school program. The plaintiff 
and his wife thereupon refused to have their children take 
part in the dancing exercises. Because of their refusal, 
the children were expelled from school. 
Decision 
The decision for the District Court of Appeals was 
delivered by the Honorable Justice Hart, the opinion may 
best be summarized by direct quotation. In addressing the 
five questions presented in the overview, the court main­
tained: 
A determination by a school board in 
inaugurating dancing as a part of the 
curriculum, that dancing is not opposed to 
religious scruples or belief of any person 
or persons, is not conclusive on the courts, 
which have the right to look into a public 
law or local ordinance for the purpose of 
determining whether upon its face it is 
reasonable, violative of any fundamental 
rights of any person, it will be nullified, 
notwithstanding Pol. Code § 1668, 1684; 
St. 1917, p. 1176, § 2. 
Persons opposed to curriculum including 
dancing in public schools need not be 
affiliated with any religious organization, 
under Const. Cal. art. 1 § 4, and Const. 
U. S. Amend. 1, investing every citizen 
with right to worship according to dictates 
of his own conscience, nor need such persons 
have any religious beliefs, but may question 
the propriety of dancing as tending to 
degradation of moral standards and as 
distracting. 
Neither the state nor a school board 
has the right to enact a law or regulation 
the effect of which will be to allienate in 
a measure the children from parental authority 
along lines looking to the building up of 
the personal character and the advancement 
of the personal welfare of the children, 
where the views of the parents are not 
offensive to the moral well-being of the 
children nor inconsistent with the best 
interests of society. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that 
in the waltz, polka, and the fox-trot, 
popularly known as round dances, the 
dancing is performed in couples, usually by 
a male and a female, their arms around or 
about the shoulders of each other. 
and, on hearing in the Supreme Court: 
School authorities had no right to expel 
children for their refusal, in obedience to 
their parents' command, to dance the waltz, 
polka, two-step, and a dance that is equal 
or similar to the fox-trot, or any other 
dance where the arms of the children, as 
they danced with the opposite sex, were 
clasped around and about the shoulders of 
their dancing partners, under Pol. Code, § 
1668, authorizing manual and physical 
training. ̂61 
Discussion 
This case was of landmark nature for several reasons. 
Most important, perhaps, the court once again establish­
ed the fact that school boards had a right and responsi­
bility to fashion an appropriate curriculum, composed of 
161ibia. 
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courses such as reading, arithmetic and physical educa­
tion. This ruling, supportive of the school board's 
role as a curriculum-determining agent, was consistent 
with rulings prior to 1921, and would be seen to be 
consistent with rulings subsequent to this case. 
Also of major importance because of its percedent-
setting nature, was the portion of the decision concerning 
the definitions of "religious beliefs." An eloquently 
written statement of the opinion addressed this matter, 
as follows: 
A man's religion is always 'personal to 
himself,' whether he be a member of a church 
or not. Whom could a man's religion concern 
but himself? True, if a member of a church 
organization, he will, of course, as he should, 
endeavor, in the very best way of which he is 
capable, to spread and disseminate the principles 
of the religion of which he is a devotee and so 
assist in upbuilding and fortifying the spirtual 
standard of the world; yet, in the last analysis, 
his religion is his and is, of course, personal 
to himself, as it is to every other person who 
professes it.162 
This definition made it quite clear that the court 
felt there was no obligation of the part of C. C. Hardwick 
or his wife to go any further than a statement that the 
dancing was contrary to their religion and a follow-up 
statement explaining the substance of their opposition. 
162Ibid., p. 53. 
Though this may appear vague after only surface inspection, 
it stands as a very reasonable part of the ruling; it 
emphasizes the reasons for opposition, other than religious 
beliefs. 
A third reason for this decision's standing out among 
curriculum rulings is that the role of parents, with regard 
to the discipline and control of their children in school-
related matters, was clearly defined by the courts. This 
ruling, like all rulings of a similar nature, made the 
assumption that: 
....the views of parents affecting the 
education and disciplining of their children 
are reasonable, relate to matters in the 
rearing and education of their children as to 
which their voice and choice should first be 
heeded and not offensive to the moral well-
being of the children or inconsistent with the 
best interests of society. 
The decision, based upon the above assumptions, 
reinforced previous court opinions, and established that 
leaving parents out of the decision-making process, with 
regard to curriculum matters, was beyond the scope of 
state agencies. The opinion stated: 
Indeed, it would be distinctly revolutionary 
and possibly subversive of that home life so 
essential to the safety and security of society 
and the government which regulates it, the very 
opposite effect of what the public school system 
163Ibid., p. 54. 
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is designed to accomplish, to hold that any such 
overreaching power existed in the state or any 
of its agencies.*64 
The fourth reason for the importance of this case is 
that the justices set a precedent of actually delving into 
the content of the curriculum. Not only was an investigation 
conducted of the reasonableness of including dance in the 
physical education curriculum; the dance itself was closely 
examined by the court. Research has shown that such an 
in-depth examination of a part of the curriculum had been, 
prior to this case, and would continue to be, subsequent 
to this case, a rare occurrence. The facts of the case and 
the opinion delivered indicate that the controversial 
nature of the activity involved accepted social values 
in 1920-21, and this influenced the court in this area. 
The opinion shows clearly that folk dancing would have 
been considered an acceptable and legitimate activity to 
require of students, since "the method of its performance 
is not in any sense offensive and is entirely different 
from the modern method of performing that exercise."I®5 
The opinion ruled that the dancing in this case was not 
164Ibid. 
16^Ibid., p. 55. 
folk dancing, however, and concluded that: 
Indeed, the dances referred to in the 
complaint are not strictly the "folk dances" 
which were in common vogue 30 or even 20 
years ago. The complaint, as we have seen, 
specifically describes the dances which are 
taught and practiced in the school in question 
as the "waltz" step, the "polka" step, and 
the "two-step," and a dance that is equal 
or similar to the "fox-trot." The "waltz," 
the "polka," and the "fox-trot" are popularly 
known as "round dances," or where (as we know 
from common knowledge) the dancing is performed 
in couples, usually by a male and a female, 
their arms clasped around or about the shoulders 
of each other and the couple thus together 
or synchronously moving over and around the 
dancing floor, and, as the Century Dictionary 
describes it, performing 'a series of cadenced 
steps and rhythmic movements.' Thus it is very 
clear that the dances referred to in the 
complaint are no different, so far as the 
general method of executing them is concerned, 
from what are known as "up-to-date" dances. 
Indeed, the dances described in the complaint 
were included within the amusement of that 
character which was common among the people 
down to the time that so-called modern dances 
were introduced, and there has always been 
more or less opposition from religious 
as well as some nonreligious people against 
that form of amusement. In fact, opposition 
of certain churches and the members thereof 
to dancing has always been so pronounced that 
it would, a half a century ago, have come as 
a shock, even to those of perverted notions 
of morality, if it had been announced that 
the dancing referred to in the complaint had 
then been introduced into the public schools 
as a gart of the physical instruction there-
166Ibid. 
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A final reason for the landmark nature of this case 
is that the courts established the penalty instituted by 
the school as inconsistent with and inappropriate for the 
transgression and circumstances involved. In contrast to 
the Guernsey v. Pitkin ruling cited in the language arts 
section above, the court ruled that the two students should 
not have been expelled and must be reinstated immediately 
as pupils in good standing in their school. 
Music and Art 
Jones v. Board of Trustees of Culver City School 
District, et. al., Cal. App (2d) 146, 
47 Pac (2d) 804 (1935) 
Overview 
The court, in Jones v. Board of Trustees of Culver 
City School District, reviewed and addressed several issues. 
Although these issues pertained to dismissal of a teacher, 
as well as curriculum, they still are important in an 
examination of curriculum evolution, especially in the 
music area. 
i c. 7 
The issues reviewed were: (1) Was the dismissal 
of a music teacher within a state statute authorizing the 
167 
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decrease in employee number, because of the discontinuance 
of a "particular kind of service" in the district? (2) Did 
the board actually discontinue the particular kind of 
service or was it substantially continued, but carried out 
by other employees? (3) Was the school board empowered to 
declare a discontinuation of the music program? 
Facts 
Gertrude Jones had been employed by the Culver City 
School District as a permanent teacher of music in one of 
the schools of that district. She continued in her employ­
ment until, on May 11, 1933, a resolution was passed by the 
board of trustees, stating "that the subject of music be 
discontinued in the schools of the district at the end of 
this school year."-'-®® Jones was prevented from teaching 
music at the beginning of the following school year, 
having been notified by the trustees, in writing, that she 
had been dismissed. 
During the school year which followed the May 11 ruling 
by the trustees, music was continued as a subject in the 
school district and, in particular, in Jones's school. Such 
instruction was not substantially changed, excepting that 
other teachers gave the music instruction, along with their 
other subjects. 
168Ibid., p. 804. 
The lower court ruled that Jones should be reinstated 
with back pay; this ruling was appealed by the defendant 
169 
board of trustees. The case was reviewed by the District 
Court of Appeals, Second District, Division 2, California, 
and an opinion recorded on June 27, 1935. 
Decision 
The decision of the appeals court was delivered by 
Justice pro tem. Fricke. The ruling of the court on the 
three questions presented in the overview of this section 
was as follows: 
Dismissal of permanent teacher of music in 
city school held within statute authorizing 
decrease of number of employees on account of 
discontinuance of a particular kind of service, 
where the particular service teacher rendered 
was discontinued, though the subject was 
thereafter taught by other teachers in addition 
to their teaching of the other subjects (Code, 
i 5.710). 
Dismissal of permanent music teacher in 
city school based on discontinuance of particular 
kind of service held invalid, where resolution 
of school board stated that the subject of 
music was discontinued and written notice to 
teacher declared that school board discontinued 
the subject of music, and there was no suggestion 
that object of the resolution was merely to 
discontinue the particular service rendered 
by the teacher(School Code, §3.781, 5.710). 
169Ibid. 
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Resolution of school board "that the 
subject of music be discontinued" held 
beyond power of board, since music is a 
prescribed branch of study (School Code, 
I 3.761).170 
Discussion 
This case was of a landmark nature for several reasons. 
First of all, the ruling from the court established that 
boards of trustees, in the absence of abuse of discretion 
or misinterpretation of state statute, could reduce the 
number of district employees, when a "particular kind of 
service in the district was discontinued.^ The court 
made a distinction between the "kind of service"-'-7^ which 
the teacher rendered and "the service"!7^ itself. The 
opinion delivered by Fricke makes it apparent that a 
particular kind of service could be discontinued and the 
employee who was providing that kind of service could be 
dismissed, so long as the service itself was continued by 
other employees. If the board of trustees could literally 
have abolished the music program or if the board had 
correctly stated its intention to abolish a "kind of 
service," the dismissal would have been upheld. Such, of 
course, was not found to be the case. 
170Ibid. 
171Ibid., p. 805 
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Regarding the second issue at question in this c a s e ,  
it is important to recognize that the ruling refuted the 
contention by the board of trustees that the music program 
had been discontinued. To the contrary, the court found 
that the music service was being provided for students in 
the district by other classroom teachers, and had been 
provided since the time Jones had been dismissed. This 
finding invalidated the expressed reason, "that the subject 
of music be discontinued,"174 given by the board of trustees 
for Jones's dismissal. 
The most important aspect of the ruling by the 
appellate court is inherent in the opinion delivered 
concerning the third issue considered. This opinion made 
it abundantly clear that a board of trustees may not 
resolve to discontinue any part of the school curriculum 
which was required by the School Code. The language in 
the opinion best summarizes this discussion. It reads: 
Furthermore, since music is one of the 
prescribed branches of study (School Code, 
§ 3.761), a resolution to wholly discontinue the 
teaching thereof was beyond the powers of the 
board. The written notice to respondent like­
wise declares that the school board "did on 
May 11, 1933, discontinue the subject of music." 
174Ibid. 
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There is neither a substantial compliance nor 
any effort at compliance with section 5.710, 
and the effort toward the dismissal of respon­
dent was invalid and ineffectual. 
175 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Vocational Education 
State ex rel. Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 
144 NW 1039 (1914) 
Overview 
176 
This landmark case in the area of vocational 
education was heard by the Supreme Court of Nebraska and 
ruled upon by that court on January 7, 1914. During the 
course of its hearing and in its ruling, the court addressed 
a number of questions: (1) What was the proper test of 
a petition of mandamus? (2) What was the right of the parents 
in making a reasonable selection for their child from courses 
offered in the school curriculum? (3) What was the extent 
of the authority granted to school officials and boards 
of trustees, regarding the course of study? (4) Did the 
school board exceed its authority in expelling Eunice Kelly 
and, if so, was writ of mandamus proper action by the 
176 
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Supreme Court? (5) Must the school board and the school 
officials adhere to the writ of mandamus? 
Facts 
Eunice Kelly was a sixth grade student in the public 
schools of Lincoln during the school year 1912-1913. As a 
part of her required curriculum, Eunice had been assigned to 
and had regularly been attending a class in domestic 
science, which was conducted at a school different from 
her own and more than a mile distant. Sometime prior to 
December 17, 1912, Claude S. Kelly, the father of Eunice, 
requested of school officials that Eunice be excused from 
the domestic science class and so instructed Eunice not to 
attend. The record shows that on December 17, 1912, Eunice 
was expelled from the school because of her failure to 
continue in the domestic science course. The father, 
Claude Kelly, carried the complaint to the Lancaster 
County District Court, where the ruling ordered a writ of 
mandamus reinstating Eunice as a student at the school. The 
school board officials, represented as William Ferguson, 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
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Decision 
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice 
Fawcett on January 7, 1914. In summary of the several areas 
addressed, the Court ruled, as follows: 
The rule announced in State v. Chicago, 
St.P.M.& O.R.Co., 19 Neb. 476, 27 N. W. 434, 
that, "Where it is sought to test the 
sufficiency of a petition for a mandamus, 
the proper course is to demur to the petition 
upon the ground that the facts stated therein 
do not entitle the relator to the relief 
sought," reaffirmed, and the criticism of this 
practice announced in State v. Home Street 
R. Co., 43 Neb. 830, 62 N. W. 225, is with­
drawn . 
The right of a parent to make a reason­
able selection from the prescribed course of 
studies which shall be carried by his child 
in the free public schools of the state is not 
limited to any particular school nor to any 
particular grade in any such public schools. 
The public schools of the state are 
entitled to the earnest and conscientious 
support of every citizen. To that end the 
school authorities should be upheld in their 
control and regulation of our school system; 
but their power and authority should not be 
held to be unlimited. They are required to 
exercise their authority over and their 
desire to further the best interests of 
their scholars, with a due regard to the 
natural and legal rights of the parents of 
such children. 
And when a parent makes a reasonable 
selection from the course of studies which 
has been prescribed by the school authorities 
and requests that his child may be excused 
from taking the same, the request should be 
granted. If the request be denied and the 
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child is expelled or suspended for a refusal 
to continue such study, mandamus will lie to 
compel reinstatement. 
Mandamus by the State, on relation of 
Claude S. Kelly, against William H. Ferguson 
and others. From judgment for olaintiff, 
defendants appeal. Affirmed. 77 
Discussion 
Kelly v. Ferguson was a landmark case for several 
reasons. Perhaps most important, the Court addressed and 
clearly defined the role of parents in curriculum determina­
tion. As has been demonstrated consistently throughout 
the various sections of this paper, the courts have con­
sidered parental involvement in the selection of courses 
for their children as an undeniable privilege, one that the 
state or a local board may not arbitrarily take away. 
Speaking eloquently to the point, the Court said: 
The public school is one of the main 
bulwarks of our nation, and we would not 
knowingly do anything to undermine it; but 
we should be careful to avoid permitting 
our love for this noble institution to cause 
us to regard it "all in all" and destroy both 
the God-given and constitutional right of 
a parent to have some voice in the-bringing 
up and education of his children. 
•*-77Ibid. , p. 1040. 
178 
Edward C. Bolmeier, School In The Legal 
Structure (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson, Co., 1974), 
pT 283. 
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This case may be designated as landmark for a second 
reason. The Court, in its wisdom, recognized the respon­
sibility of the state and the local board of education in 
curriculum determination, and so stressed the importance 
of that role in its ruling. The Court made it clear, 
through reference to this and other cases, that state 
statute and school policy must be tempered by the right of 
the parent "to make a reasonable selection from the 
prescribed studies for his child to pursue.The ruling 
of the Court in regard to this "governmental limitation" 
was more explicit than in any foregoing cases, to the 
point of chastisement of the school system. This case 
clearly paints a picture of the court justices flexing 
their judicial muscles. 
Time and again, case decisions have established that 
expulsion is not a legitimate consequence for failure to 
participate in a curriculum activity if parents have 
requested that a student be excused; this case is no 
exception, and it is important for that reason. In 
addition, this ruling went a step further than others, and 
spoke to the well being of other students, as well as the 
student in question. The ruling stated: 
179Ibid., p. 1042. 
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There is no good reason why the failure 
of one or more pupils to study one or more 
prescribed branches should result disastrously 
to the proper discipline, efficiency, and well-
being of the school. Such pupils are not idle 
but merely devoting their attention to other 
branches; and so long as the failure of the 
students, thus excepted, to study all the 
branches of the prescribed course does not 
prejudice the equal rights of other students, 
there is no cause for complaint.180 
Mathematics and Science 
The State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145, 32 
Am. Rep. 128 (1878) 
Overview 
The court considered three issues in the case of 
181 
The State v. Mizner. Two of these proved to be issues 
which the courts had ruled upon before in curriculum cases. 
The third issue is one which was new at the time of decision 
and is also one which has not been addressed at any other 
point in this study. The issues in question were: 
(1) Could it be assumed that punishment of a student 
by a teacher was always for reasonable cause? (2) Must 
punishment administered by a teacher be for a specific 
offense and must the student know what he is being punished 
180Ibid. 
1 ft! 
The State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145, 32 Am. Rep. 
128 (1878). 
for? (3) Could a student be corporally punished for 
refusing, under parental order, to comply with a teacher's 
instructions? 
Facts 
This case was appealed by the defendant, Mizner, from 
a ruling by a Justice of the Peace to the Allamakee 
District Court and finally to the Supreme Court of Iowa. 
Ada Bremer, twenty-one years of age, was a student in a 
class taught by Mizner, the defendant. Ada's father twice 
sent notes to Mizner, through his daughter, which read 
as follows: "Please excuse Ada afternoons, as her health 
will not permit her to attend all the time", and "please 
excuse Ada from the algebra class, she having more lessons 
than she can well attend to."l®2 
Upon being handed the notes, Mizner questioned the 
origin of them and declined to excuse Ada from either 
afternoon recitations or the algebra class. Then, as a 
result of continued lack of participation on Ada's part 
and partly because of a sarcastic interchange between Ada 
and her teacher, the girl was whipped with a four-foot 
rod. The teacher, Mizner, was subsequently charged with 
assault and convicted by a Justice of the Peace, which 
decision was twice appealed, finally to the Supreme Court 
of Iowa. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the ruling of the 
lower courts. Justice Seevers gave the court's opinion. 
The decision established: 
In the absence of proof to the contrary 
the law will presume that a teacher punishes 
a pupil for a reasonable cause, and in a 
moderate and reasonable manner; but this 
presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
The punishment of the pupil must be for 
some specific offense which the pupil has 
committed, and which he knows he is being 
punished for. 
The teacher is not authorized to punish 
a pupil for refusing to do something the 
parent has requested that the pupil be excused 
from doing. The teacher may be justified in 
refusing to permit the attendance of a pupil 
whose parent will not consent that he shall 
obey the rules of the school.I®3 
Discussion 
This case was of importance for a number of reasons, 
but was of landmark nature because it was one of the 
earliest cases to address the matter of required curriculum 
(algebra) and the matter of appropriate punishment, if a 
183Ibid., p. 145. 
parent's request conflicted with that of school officials. 
It is of particular interest to note the apparent conflict 
between the third part of the ruling in this case and 
rulings on the same topic in other cases. In Mizner, the 
court clearly stated that expulsion was a legitimate 
consequence for failure on the part of a student to comply 
with a teacher's directions, even if the parents had sent 
a written statement to the contrary. In other cases, 
such as Hardwick v. Trustees, the court just as clearly 
stated that expulsion could not be used, although the 
circumstances were virtually identical. 
Another reason for the importance of this case was 
the attention paid by the court to the issue of corporal 
punishment. Not only did the justices establish that 
corporal punishment should only be used for specific 
offenses; they also established that the student being 
corporally punished must be aware of what he had done 
wrong. 
The final portion of the ruling, which had major 
impact on the teaching profession, pertained to the 
reasonableness of corporal punishment being inflicted 
by a teacher. In this regard, the court made it quite 
clear that, "unless proof rebutted the presumption,"^®^ 
a teacher's punishment of a pupil was assumed to be for a 
reasonable cause. 
Research did not reveal any cases in the area of 
science, other than those concerning evolution, a topic 
which must be reserved for another investigative forum. 
For this reason, no cases in the area of science are 
cited in this study. 
Social Studies 
Pauline Jones v. City of Fitchburg, 97 NE 
612 (Mass. 1912) 
Overview 
Jones v. Fitchburg was litigated about a curriculum 
matter but had all the overtones of a due process case. 
In this case, the court addressed several questions: 
(1) Could the school require a pupil to participate 
in a social studies exercise? (2) Could a student be 
expelled for failure to participate in the social studies 
exercise? (3) Could the school board expel the student 
without a due process hearing? 
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Facts 
Pauline Jones, a student at the Ashburnham Street 
School, was required by her principal to participate in a 
social studies exercise, which involved role-playing 
the parts of various public officials. While Pauline 
was performing the role of a police officer, she and 
her principal got into a disagreement, after which 
she refused to continue the exercise. She was duly 
informed by the principal that she would be expelled, unless 
she continued with the assigned responsibility. The 
school board, after being informed of the suspension of 
the student, supported the principal and officially 
notified the father that his daughter could "return to 
school upon condition that she submit to the direction of 
the principal of the school."185 T^e father had thereto­
fore requested written explanation for the expulsion and 
was not satisfied with the answer he received or the fact 
that the school board did not conduct a hearing on the 
matter. The case was tried in the Supreme Court, resulting 
in a determination in favor of the plaintiff. This 
185Jones v. Fitchburg, 97 NE 612 (Mass. 1912). 
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decision was appealed by the defendant, City of Fitchburg, 
and was ruled upon February 27, 1912, after the appeals 
trial was conducted. 
Decision 
The court ruled, in the Jones v. Fitchburg case, 
in two areas. They were: 
The school officials and the school board 
were empowered to require social studies and 
activities consistent with the goals of the 
social studies program, as a part of the 
curriculum; 
and 
The school board was in error for expelling 
the student without a due process hearing; there­
fore, the student was ordered reinstated. 8° 
The appeal by the defendant was therefore denied. 
Discussion 
This case in the area of social studies reinforced 
decisions which preceded it, especially regarding the 
right and responsibility of the school and school board 
to require various subjects and accompanying activities in 
the curriculum. The opinion made it clear that the "general 
management of the public schools had been conferred on the 
school committee," and that "the plaintiff's exclusion was 
^•^^Ibid. , pp. 67, 68. 
not lawful unless it acted in violation of the provisions 
of R. L. C. 44 | 7 and 8, under which the action was 
brought."187 
Further, the opinion addressed the all-important 
issue of due process, and clearly established that, had 
due process regulations been followed, the expulsion 
would have been unquestioned. Along these lines, the 
opinion concluded: 
The board consequently knew that the 
plaintiff had been denied readmission and 
deprived of the benefit of the public 
schools because of alleged misconduct. 
They also must have been aware that their 
vote then passed to sustain the principal 
established a condition which could be 
terminated only by the acknowledgement 
of the plaintiff, that her conduct was 
unjustifiable, although upon an impartial 
inquiry by the committee she might have 
been exonerated, or a less severe penalty 
might have been imposed. It was open to 
them upon receiving the application to have 
ordered a hearing, and decided the 
question whether she had been guilty of 
insubordination, and their decision 
affirming the order, if made in good 
faith would have been final. 
187t,. j XD1U« f p« 
188tujJ Ibid., p. 
67. 
68. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY 
The public school academic curriculum has been the 
subject of litigation on numerous occasions, at higher 
levels of court jurisdiction. Since the mid-1800's, 
plaintiff after plaintiff has questioned the right of 
state legislatures to prescribe which courses may be a part 
of the curriculum, the right of state legislatures to 
delegate the decision-making power to local boards of 
education, and the right of those local boards of education 
to make and enforce curriculum decisions for their respec­
tive schools. 
Litigation in the curriculum area was characterized by 
inconsistent rulings during the late 1800's and early 
1900's. During that period of time, however, four persis­
tent threads were already emerging in court opinions. The 
first concerned the right of a parent to have a voice in 
determining which course of study a student would take. 
Regarding this issue, the opinions almost invariably 
reinforced the necessity, both moral and legal, of 
allowing a parent some latitude in making curriculum 
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selections or in requesting exclusions from particular 
courses of study. 
Second, court opinions emphasized, time and again, 
that: 
The power of the prescribing which 
shall or which shall not be taught in 
said schools rests with the legislature 
of the state and not with the courts. 
The legislature may, from time to time, 
exercise this power and make modifications 
as in its wisdom and discretion may seem 
fit and proper for the purposes of the 
grant, subject only to the Constitution 
of the State. 
Third, court opinions during the embryonic era from 
1850 to about 1925 emphasized the delegatory powers of the 
state legislature and the powers of the local boards. This 
sort of opinion was epitomized in the Myers Publishing 
190 Company Case (1901), as the court stated: 
....the Legislature has given the 
trustees of the public school corporations 
the discretionary power to direct.... 
what branches of learning, in addition to 
those specified in the statutes, shall be 
taught by the public schools in their 
respective Corporations.1^1 
I Q Q 
Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 77 Mo. 484, 
(1883) . 
1 90 
Myers Publishing Co. v. White River School 
Township, 28 Ind. App., 91 62 NE 66 (1901). 
191Ibid. 
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The fourth area of persistency in rulings also 
involved parental input, and went a step further than 
rulings related to the first area mentioned in this 
summary. A number of court opinions established that 
parental input in curriculum matters must be respected. 
Additional opinions stated that a student whose parent 
had given written request for exclusion from a particular 
course of studies could not be corporally punished or 
expelled from school for failure to comply with the 
school officials' directive. 
Cases which arose after World War I resulted in 
opinions which added support to prior decisions and 
created new rulings in other areas. 
Many cases were litigated in the area of foreign 
language, with the courts consistently supporting the right 
of the state legislature and the school board to include 
such courses in the curriculum. Also, the courts 
addressed the right of a parent to determine whether his 
child should be enrolled in a foreign language course. 
A volume of cases arose in the area of health and 
physical education. Once again, the courts consistently 
supported the right of school officials to offer physical 
education either as an elective or as a required course 
in the curriculum, but carefully scrutinized some of the 
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activities associated with the required courses. 
Questions in the areas of music and art, vocational 
education, mathematics and science, and social studies, 
were not frequently subjects for litigation. In the few 
cases which did come to the attention of the higher court 
justices, rulings were consistent with those mentioned 
in the foregoing portion of this summary. 
This study (1) reviewed literature related to the 
stance of the courts with regard to the public school 
academic curriculum; (2) traced the actions of the courts 
in each of the curriculum areas; and (3) presented an 
in-depth analysis of landmark cases in each of the subject 
areas defined as a part of the study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The fourth purpose of this study was to establish 
the position of the courts with regard to the public 
school academic curriculum. The conclusions resulting 
from analysis of the related literature and the court 
decisions which were utilized in this study are listed 
below: 
1. The power to prescribe the courses which will 
be taught in the public school academic curriculum resides 
in the state legislature. 
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2. The state legislature may delegate decision­
making power in public school academic curriculum matters 
to state and local boards of education. 
3. The courts may not interfere with the decisions 
of the state legislature or state and local boards of 
education with regard to public school academic curriculum 
matters, unless there is evidence of fraud or abuse. 
4. Parental opinion regarding the selection of an 
appropriate course of studies for the children must be 
respected by school officials. 
5. Students may not be punished by expulsion or 
corporal punishment for failure to participate in a 
particular course activity, if the parent of that student 
has submitted written request that the student be excluded 
and so long as the written request from the parent is not 
of an arbitrary or capricious nature. 
EPILOGUE 
The evolution of the public school academic curriculum, 
as interpreted through a number of court decisions, is not 
complete. Although no recent landmark decisions have 
come out of the courts, the curriculum will continue to 
metamorphose as our societal structure changes. As this 
process goes on, and unfamiliar curriculum territory is 
explored, there will inevitably be litigation. It will 
be fascinating to observe those instances of courtroom 
drama, as opinions are delivered which will be vital to 
the educational process. 
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